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Collective Management of Copyright and
Neighbouring Rights in Canada:
An International Perspective
By Daniel J. Gervais †

Introduction

labour’’) required to amass the necessary data. 6 A similar
conclusion was reached by the Federal Court of Appeal
in this country, in a decision in which the traditional line
of United Kingdom cases was discussed in great detail. 7
This decision now seems to be in peril, however. 8 Courts
in the U.K. require that the skill and labour be ‘‘original’’ 9 to satisfy the copyright requirement, owing perhaps in part to the harmonization of copyright within
the European Union through the adoption of so-called
‘‘directives’’ that EU member States (including the U.K.)
must internalize in their domestic copyright legislation. 10
Only in Australia is the traditional U.K. criterion still
clearly applied: the Federal Court (Full Court), in a
lengthy and interesting decision, 11 refused to follow Feist
and Tele-Direct and considered itself bound by the traditional line of U.K. cases, including the University of
London Press case. However, the two judges who
expressed their views recommended that the High Court
or Parliament should reconsider the matter. 12
The Supreme Court of Canada, in a much-awaited
judgment, recently decided that, at least as far as economic rights are concerned, the origins of Canadian
copyright law, and its underlying theory, were strictly
common law. 13 However, the majority of the Court cited
American, U.K., Australian and New Zealand cases as
emanating from ‘‘like-minded jurisdictions’’. 14 This does
not answer the question whether Canada should follow
the U.S. 15 and the Europeans, 16 or stay the older British
precedents as the Australian Federal Court recently felt
compelled to do. 17
Independently of whether Canadian copyright law
is one origin or another, the central role of authors in
copyright policy is nothing new in this country. In fact,
Canadian courts have recognized the principle several
times. For example, in a recent Federal Court decision
(on appeal), Gibson J. stated: ‘‘The Copyright Act 18
should be interpreted in light of its object and purpose
which is to benefit authors’’. 19 In another recent decision,
the Quebec Court of Appeal also insisted on the role of
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t is a generally held view that copyright in civil law
countries is a child of the French Revolution and
should be considered an inalienable right of the author,
a human right in other words. In fact, it is enshrined in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. 1
Granted, in several cases the economic component of the
right 2 is transferred to, e.g., a publisher or a producer, but
it remains, at source, a right of the author, the creator of
the protected work (or object of a related right). By contrast, one often hears that, in common law jurisdictions,
copyright is essentially a publisher’s monopoly that was
extended over the years to also cover authors. 3 Historically, there is some basis for these assertions, as indeed
copyright law in the U.K. originated as publishing
monopolies accorded to the Stationers’ Company, while
in France, clearly the human right (author-centred)
approach has dominated since the late-18th century.
However, civil law jurisdictions have had to deal with
realities of commerce, such as the decision made in the
mid-1980s to protect databases and computer programs
(that often have no identifiable human author) by copyright. 4 Conversely, in common law jurisdictions, the
importance of the author as the originator (or sine qua
non) of literary and artistic creation was progressively
recognized. While this recognition seems to have taken a
less prominent place for most of the twentieth century,
the role of the author in U.K. copyright law is perhaps
more palpable of late. One of the visible signs of this shift
is the insistence in recent high-profile court cases on the
need for ‘‘originality’’ to award copyright creation, a
more ‘‘human’’ test than the previous criterion, which
only required evidence of some ‘‘skill and labour’’. 5
This shift, which is still uneven among common law
jurisdictions, was first signalled in the United States in a
decision by the Supreme Court denying copyright protection to a telephone directory, in spite of the enormous
number of hours of work and research (‘‘skill and
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the author. 20 It is equally true of course to say that copyright is a strategic industrial right that allows key cultural
industries, such as book and music publishing, record
production, computer software programming and film
production, to develop and grow. In fact, studies generally place the value of copyright between 4 and 7.5% of
an industrialized country’s GDP. 21
What is the role of collective management of copyright 22 in this picture? In a recent 7–2 decision, the
United States Supreme Court upheld the rights of individual freelancers to control the electronic reuse of texts
submitted to newspaper and periodical publishers,
including the New York Times and Time Inc., for publication in their paper edition. 23 The decision is interesting because, while the Court fully recognized that
copyright vests in the author (absent an express transfer),
it refused to enjoin the publishers from using the material. Instead, it ‘‘forced’’ the parties to negotiate. 24 The
only ‘‘model’’ the Supreme Court referred to in the decision is the licensing of musical works for broadcast use,
i.e., collective management. It is too early to know
whether the parties to this Tasini case will find a way to
remunerate authors for the electronic use of their works
and whether this will entail any form of collective
administration. The Court’s thinly veiled warning is
clear: if the parties do not succeed, the Court and/or
Congress may do so in their stead. Clearly, the U.S.
Supreme Court thought that given the number of publications in the United States and the number of freelance
writers that submit content to these publications, a collective system would make sense (though it is not necessarily the only option).
Collective management of copyright allows authors
and other rightsholders such as performers, publishers
and producers to monitor and, in some cases, control,
certain uses of their works 25 that would be otherwise
unmanageable individually due to the large number of
users worldwide. The use of music for broadcast by radio
stations is perhaps the best example of such a use. Collective management may also allow authors to use the
power of collective bargaining to obtain more for the use
of their work and negotiate on a less unbalanced basis
with large multinational user groups. That being said,
most collective schemes value all works in their repertory
on the same economic footing, which may be unfair to
those who create works that may have a higher value in
the eyes of users. Last but not least, collective management ensures that users will have easy access to the rights
needed to use material protected by copyright.
Collective Management Organizations (CMOs or
simply ‘‘collectives’’) function in a variety of ways. They
may be agents for a group of rightsholders who voluntarily entrusted the licensing of one or more uses of their
works to a collective. Or they may be assignees of copyright. In some cases, rightsholders must transfer rights to
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all their works to the CMO, while in other cases,
rightsholders are allowed to pick and choose which
works the CMO will administer on their behalf. Certain
Collective Management Organizations license work-bywork; others offer users a whole ‘‘repertory’’ of works.
This may be combined with an indemnity clause,
according to which the Collective Management Organization will indemnify the user if she/he is sued for using
(according to the terms of the licence) one of the works
whose use was licensed by the CMO. This indemnity
often takes the form of an obligation to defend.
Collective Management Organizations usually
belong to one of the two main ‘‘families’’ of Collective
Management Organizations, namely the International
Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers
(CISAC), 26 the largest and oldest association of CMOs, or
to the International Federation of Reproduction Rights
Organizations (IFRRO). 27 It is worth mentioning
Article 1 of IFRRO’s Statutes, which states, ‘‘collective or
centralized management is preferable where the individual exercise of rights is impracticable’’. This, in fact, is
the essence of collective management: make copyright
work when individual exercise would be impracticable
for rightsholders, users, or both, usually due to the sheer
number of rightsholders, users and/or uses.
Collective Management Organizations are now
facing the challenges of the digital age. Claims that copyright does not work in the digital age are usually the
result of the inability of users to use protected material
lawfully. Especially using the Internet, users of copyright
material can easily access millions of works and parts of
works, including government documents, legal, scientific, medical and other professional journals, music,
video excerpts, e-books, etc. While digital access is fairly
easy once a work has been located (though it may
require identifying oneself and/or paying for a subscription or other fee), obtaining the right to use the material
beyond its primary use (which is usually only listening,
viewing or reading) is more difficult unless already
allowed under the terms of the licence or subscription
agreement or as an exception to exclusive rights contained in the Copyright Act. In some cases, this is the
result of the rightsholders’ unwillingness to authorize the
use and a legitimate application of their exclusive rights.
Yet, there are several other cases where it is simply the
unavailability of simple, user-friendly licensing that
makes authorized use impossible. Both rightsholders and
users are losers in this scenario: rightsholders because
they cannot provide authorized (controlled) access to
their works and lose the benefits of orderly distribution
of their works, and users because there is no easy authorized access to the right to reuse digital material. In other
words, this inability to ‘‘control’’ their works means that
these works are simply unavailable (legally) on the Web.
The Napster case 28 comes to mind in that respect.
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The pervasive nature of the Internet and the
increasing tendency to link various appliances and
devices such as Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) (and
soon television sets and stereo receivers) to the global
network mean that keeping any material that can be
digitized off the Internet will become increasingly difficult, technically and commercially. While a combination
of technology and law might allow rightsholders to keep
material off major servers in a number of countries
(though not all countries have copyright laws) and/or
request that Internet Service and Access Providers
(ISPs/IAPs) block access to (domestic and foreign) Web
sites that make possible access to ‘‘pirated’’ material,
user/consumer demand for digital access may ultimately
prevail. Consequently, only rightsholders who are prepared to meet this demand will survive. In fact, as we
have argued in several other papers, 29 is not the real
question to ask whether the best course of action for
rightsholders is to minimize unlawful uses or rather to
maximize lawful, legitimate uses? Especially for massmarket works such as pop music, any attempt to prevent
access on digital networks may be perceived by some
users as an invitation to circumvent legal or technical
protection measures.
Beyond that debate, a simple fact remains: a large
amount of copyright material is (and more will be) available through digital networks and that ‘‘market’’ will
need to be organized in some way. By ‘‘organized’’, we
mean that users will want access and the ability to reuse
material lawfully. These uses include putting the material on a commercial or educational Web site or an
Intranet, e-mailing it to a group of people, reusing all or
part of it to create new copyright material, storing it and
perhaps distributing on a CD-ROM. Authors and other
rightsholders will want to ensure that they can put reasonable limits on those uses and reuses and get paid for
uses for which they decide that users should pay (again,
absent a specific exemption or compulsory licence in the
Copyright Act). Collective Management Organizations
could be critical intermediaries in this process. Their
expertise and knowledge of copyright law and management will be essential to make copyright work in the
digital age. To play that role fully and efficiently, these
organizations must acquire the rights they need to
license digital uses of protected material and build (or
improve current) information systems to deal with ever
more complex rights management and licensing tasks.
In this paper, we will compare the current Canadian
framework and activities of Collective Management
Organizations with the situation in a number of other
major countries and suggest possible improvements to
the current regime. The comparison will focus first on
the general legal background for collective management
and, second, on issues specific to the digital age. The
paper only addresses some of the specific issues raised by
the 1996 WCT and WPPT. 30

Collective Management of Rights in
Canada: An Overview
Finding An Appropriation Classification

B

ill C-32 31 introduced a definition of the expression
‘‘collective society’’. 32 In spite of this unified definition, the Act contains various (and the 1997 ‘‘C-32’’
amendments introduced new) legal regimes concerning
the collective administration of copyright and
neighbouring rights. Before turning to these legal
regimes, it is worth noting that there are several valid
ways to classify Collective Management Organizations.
One could look at the legal basis on which they operate
(in Canada) and distinguish among four main categories
of Collective Management Organizations: music performing and certain neighbouring rights (section 67 of
the Copyright Act); general regime (section 70); ‘‘particular cases’’ regime — retransmission and educational
institutions (section 71); and private copying. This is the
method we will use. However, they could also have been
classified according to their field of activity, as was done
by the Copyright Board when it listed existing Canadian
collectives (see attached Annex for the list) 33 and identified the following areas: music (11); 34 literary (6); audiovisual and multimedia (5); visual arts (4); retransmission
(8); private copying (1); educational rights (1); and media
monitoring (1).

The Four Legal Regimes
Collective management of rights in Canada is governed in four different ways, according to the right(s)
involved. These regimes (since 1997) are as follows:
●
Music performing rights (and certain
neighbouring rights)
●
General regime
●
Retransmissions and certain uses by educational
institutions
●
Private copying.
Music Performing Rights and Certain
Neighbouring Rights
This type of collective management is regulated by
section 67 of the Copyright Act. Collective Management
Organizations active in this field grant licences for the
public performance and communication to the public of
music (the underlying musical work, the performer’s performance and the producer’s sound recording). In the
case of authors, the Society of Composers, Authors and
Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN), the only collective representing copyright holders in this field, represents holders of an exclusive right under section 3 of the
Act — performers and producers have a right to equitable remuneration. Authors voluntarily assign their
rights to SOCAN, while the Act imposes collective management of the rights to remuneration. 3 5 The
Neighbouring Rights Collective of Canada (NRCC) is a
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non-profit umbrella collective, created in 1997, to
administer the rights of performers and makers of sound
recordings. This is done through its member collectives.
Collective management of rights for dramatic and literary works contained in sound recordings (notably
through ArtistI) 36 is voluntary. In fixing tariffs in this area,
the Act imposes specific criteria to be applied by the
Copyright Board. 37

user with the Board, which prevents the application of
section 45 of the Competition Act (dealing with conspiracies to limit competition). However, the Commissioner
of Competition may ask the Copyright Board to
examine the agreement if he considers it is contrary to
the public interest. 48 The Board may also be asked to
determine the royalty applicable in individual cases
(arbitration). 49

The General Regime
We refer here to the regime that governs Collective
Management Organizations in section 70.1 and following as the ‘‘general’’ regime because it applies to all
voluntary licensing schemes other than those of section
67. It is important to note, however, that in terms of
financial flows, section 67 CMOs collect (and distribute)
more money than all section 70.1 collectives combined.
This general regime could apply to the collective management of the rights of reproduction, adaptation, rental,
publication and public performance in the area of copyright (section 3); the rights of performers concerning first
fixation of their performances, reproduction and communication to the public of live performances (section
15); and certain rights of sound recording producers (section 18) and broadcasters (section 21). In practice, it
applies to: reprography, where the two main societies are
the Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency
(CANCOPY) 38 and the Société québécoise de gestion
collective des droits de reproduction (COPIBEC); 39 and
to the so-called ‘‘mechanical rights’’. 40 It also applies to
CMOs such as (a) the Society for Reproduction Rights of
Authors, Composers and Publishers in Canada
(SODRAC), which ‘‘administers royalties stemming from
the reproduction of musical works’’, 41 and (b) the Canadian Musical Reproduction Rights Agency (CMRRA), ‘‘a
Canadian centralized licensing and collecting agency for
the reproduction rights of musical works in Canada’’. 42
The visual arts and Collective Management Organizations such as the Canadian Artists’ Representation
Copyright Collective (CARCC/CARFAC), ‘‘established in
1990 to create opportunities for increased income for
visual and media artists. It provides its services to artists
who affiliate with the Collective. These services include
negotiating the terms for copyright use and issuing an
appropriate license to the use’’. 43 This also includes
SODRAC and the Société de droits d’auteur en arts
visuels (SODART) ‘‘created by the Regroupement des
artistes en arts visuels du Québec (RAAV) and responsible for collecting rights on behalf of visual artists. It
negotiates agreements with organizations that use visual
arts, such as museums, exhibition centres, magazines,
publishers, audio-visual producers, etc. SODART issues
licences to these organizations and collects royalties due
to the artists it represents’’. 44
Collective Management Organizations operating
under this regime can file tariffs for approval by the
Board 45 or conclude agreements with users 46 that will
take precedence over tariffs. 47 A CMO may, under this
regime, file a copy of an agreement concluded with a

Retransmissions and Certain Uses by Educational
Institutions (Section 71)
This is a legal (non-voluntary licence) regime. The
criteria that apply to tariff fixing procedures under this
regime are different than those of the general regime.
The section 71 regime, also known as the ‘‘particular
cases regime’’, applies to the retransmission of a distant
signal; the retransmission regime which includes, since
the 1997 amendments, the making and conservation
beyond one year of a copy of a news program or commentary by an educational institution and the public
performance of the copy; and the making of a copy of a
work at the time it is communicated to the public by an
educational institution and keeping the copy beyond 30
days to decide whether to perform the copy and the
public performance (primarily to students) of the copy.
There are eight CMOs who operate in whole or in part
under this ‘‘particular cases regime’’: Border Broadcasters’
Inc. (BBI); 50 Canadian Broadcasters Rights Agency
(CBRA); 51 Canadian Retransmission Collective (CRC); 52
Canadian Retransmission Right Association (CRRA);
Copyright Collective of Canada (CCC); FWS Joint Sports
Claimants (FWS); Major League Baseball Collective of
Canada (MLB); and the Society of Composers, Authors
and Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN). Nonmember rightsholders may claim royalties collected on
the basis of an approved tariff, subject to conditions
applicable to member rightsholders. 53
Private Copying
A specific regime was put in place concerning the
private copying of sound recordings. 54 It does not concern licensing as such, but rather a remuneration
designed to compensate rightsholders for a use of works
(and objects of neighbouring rights) that is otherwise
considered non-infringing. 55 Collectives concerned created the Canadian Private Copying Collective (CPCC),
‘‘which is responsible for distributing the funds generated by the levy to the collective societies representing
eligible authors, performers and makers of sound recordings. The member collectives of the CPCC are: the Canadian Mechanical Reproduction Rights Agency (CMRRA),
the Neighbouring Rights Collective of Canada (NRCC),
the Société de gestion des droits des artistes-musiciens
(SOGEDAM), the Society for Reproduction Rights of
Authors, Composers and Publishers in Canada
(SODRAC) and the Society of Composers, Authors and
Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN)’’. Tariffs were set
for 1999-2000 56 and for 2001-2002. 57
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Collective Management of Rights in
Canada: An International
Perspective
Overview of Foreign Collective
Management

I

t may be useful to start by looking at sectors in which
collective management is in place at the international
level, which of course depend in large part on the existence of the right concerned.
In 1998, performing rights Collective Management
Organizations in the United States collected US$698
million, or approximately US$2.50 per capita, while
France collected US$216 million, or US$3.66 per capita;
Germany collected US$344 million, or US$4.20 per
capita; and the United Kingdom US$248 million, or
US$4.20 per capita. 58 By comparison, SOCAN’s collections reached US$76 million, or US$2.53 per capita 59
(see Figure 1). Differences stemmed from a combination
of higher or lower tariffs and the depth of a CMO’s
licensing efforts. ‘‘Depth’’ in this context may be succinctly defined as the degree of effort expended to
license smaller, occasional or remote users.

data, 60 the U.S. RRO collected US$79 million, or
US$0.28 per capita, while Germany collected US$28 million or US$0.34; and the U.K. US$36 million or US$0.60.
The Nordic countries have the largest per capita collections in this field: Denmark US$3.00 per capita; Finland
US$0.92; Norway US$5.00; and Sweden US$1.00. In
Canada, the two RROs (COPIBEC and CANCOPY) collected $24 million (US$16 million) or $0.77 (US$0.52)
per capita (see Figure 2).
Reprographic Royalties (1998) in US$
(per capita basis)
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Figure 2: Reprography Collection Comparison

Performing Rights Income (1998) in US$
(per capita basis)

U.S.

Germany

Canada

Figure 1: Performing Rights Collection Comparison

In the field of reprography, the situation is uneven.
Organizations were usually established much more
recently. Still, there are striking contrasts. Using 1999

The huge differences in this field can usually be
explained by the same factors as for performing rights,
namely tariffs and depth of licensing. As we will see
below, however, the application of such factors is more
directly influenced by the applicable legal regime than
by the political or management decisions made by the
Collective Management Organization. In fact, the four
countries with the highest reprography collections all use
the system known as ‘‘extended collective licensing’’,
which will be described in greater detail below. Its
potential application in Canada will also be discussed.
A more complete list of the rights administered collectively around the world is contained in Table 1.

Table 1: Areas of Collective Management in Foreign Countries 61
Right Administered

Examples of Countries

Droit de suite

Denmark, France, Germany, Spain

Private Copying

Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain

Reprography

32 countries worldwide. Mandatory in France, Germany,
Netherlands (libraries and education)

Rental right

Denmark, Spain

Cable retransmission

Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, U.K.

Secondary use of radio or television broadcasts

Denmark

26
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Right Administered

Almost 100 countries worldwide

Music mechanical rights

More than 70 countries worldwide

Copies of television programs for the benefit of
handicapped persons

Denmark

Public lending right

Germany, Netherlands, Spain (not fully applicable yet)

Public performance of performers’ performances

Netherlands, Spain

Public communication of audiovisual works

Spain

Public performance of phonograms (producers)

Spain

Transformation (adaptation) right

Spain

Grand rights (theatrical)

France

Visual Artists’ Reproduction Right

France, Germany, U.K., U.S.A.

Photographers’ Reproduction Right

Nordic countries, U.K., U.S.A.

Use of videocassettes in public places

U.S.A.

Aspects To Be Considered

Seq: 6

Legal Status of CMOs
The current Canadian system does not impose a
particular legal form for the collective management of
copyright and neighbouring rights. A number of models
are in existence. Some CMOs are for-profit corporations,
but often controlled by a not-for-profit foundation, while
several others are themselves not-for-profit entities. 62 In
foreign countries, the situation is similar. While a
majority of Collective Management Organizations are
not-for-profit entities, that is not always the case. In
Europe, only two of the 15 European Union countries’
legislation requires a specific legal form for CMOs. In
Italy, SIAE, the Italian Society of Authors and Publishers
and the principal Collective Management Organization
in the country is in fact a public authority, while in
Greece, AEPI is a commercial (for-profit) company. 63
The success or failure of collectives does not seem to
be linked to their legal status. Successful collectives
operate under various legal configurations, and the same
could be said of less successful ones. As a result, this area
does not seem to require harmonization or governmental intervention.
Another aspect of the examination of the structure
of a Collective Management Organization is to determine its status as a monopoly, de jure or de facto. There
are a number of cases in Canada where a single collective operates in a given field. The best-known example is
probably SOCAN for music performing rights. In other
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There are several aspects of collective management
of rights and its relation to the legislative and regulatory
framework to review. They are: the legal status of CMOs;
the modes of acquisition of rights (mandates) by CMOs;
the legislative support, if any, for CMOs’ rights acquisition process(es); state control of CMOs (formation
and/or operations); tariffs & licensing practices; and distribution practices and accounting. We will use these
areas to map out our comparative analysis.
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Examples of Countries

Music performing rights (authors)

cases, competition is possible between two Collective
Management Organizations, while in others, two CMOs
operate in the same field but within different language
or territory-based markets. Very few countries impose a
de jure monopoly. This is the case in Italy, where the
main Collective Management Organization (SIAE) is a
public authority, in the Netherlands (BUMA) and in
Spain, where the law expressly discourages competition
among Collective Management Organizations. 64 In
countries where a state authorization is required to set
up a new collective, monopolies exist by reason of an
exclusive appointment. That is the case in Austria, Japan
(JASRAC only), 65 Denmark (KODA only), Finland (certain rights only) and the Netherlands (certain rights
only). 66 In a great number of countries, in fact a majority
of the countries where CMOs operate, 67 there is only
one Collective Management Organization per field of
activity.
A combination of market forces and the application
of existing competition rules if and when appropriate are
sufficient to prevent abuses of the rights of rightsholders
and users. In the current legal environment, Canadian
rightsholders may create a new Collective Management
Organization if they are dissatisfied with an existing one.
In fact, users themselves could do the same, as was suggested by a well-known author in the area of reprography. 68 Against this backdrop, there is little evidence of
a need for additional regulation in this field.
With respect to the establishment of a legal
monopoly in the Copyright Act itself, this practice is
clearly the exception at the international level. Should
the State decide to intervene to limit the number of
Collective Management Organizations, then the appropriate procedure would not be to establish a de jure
monopoly in favour of a particular CMO. In the same
way that rightsholders should be free to decide whether
they want to be part of a collective scheme (except perhaps where individual management is impossible), they
should be free to create new Collective Management
Organizations. However, as discussed below in relation
to the development of rights management systems,
Canada has by far the largest number of Collective Man-

Collective Management of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights in Canada

agement Organizations, especially in relation to the
country’s population. This resulted in part from the 1997
amendments to the Act (Bill C-32). The number of collectives is probably too high and it seems unlikely that
all can survive in a limited market. 69 That said, a statutory approval mechanism for the establishment of new
Collective Management Organizations, which arguably
could have been considered in 1997, is probably of little
use now that 36 CMOs are in existence. (Although, eight
of those 36 do not have direct contact with users and
operate under ‘‘umbrella collectives’’.)
The post-formation control of the activities and
operations of CMOs is discussed later in this article.
However, it is worth mentioning here that the Government may wish to monitor the operations of CMOs and,
should the market show through growing inefficiencies
and/or rightsholders (or user) dissatisfaction that the
number of (competing) collectives is such that they are
unable to operate efficiently, the situation described in
this section of the report could be re-examined.
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Acquisition of Rights (Mandates)
This is perhaps the most important regulatory
aspect of the activities of Collective Management Organizations. To a large extent, the credibility of CMOs vis-àvis users depends on its ability to license the works and
rights that users want. For a new Collective Management
Organization or a CMO trying to license new use or use
by a new group of users, the critical phase is thus usually
the acquisition of the necessary licensing authority from
the rightsholders concerned. This only applies of course
to voluntary licensing and not to, e.g., private copying
levies or non-voluntary licences (because then authority
is granted by law). Acquisition of rights by a CMO is
done using one or several of the following methods: a
full assignment of rights to the CMO; a non-exclusive
licence; an authorization to act as agent; a sui generis
(mixed) regime; or a legal (non-voluntary) licence. All of
these models are in use in Canada. For example, in the
music field, composers and lyricists assign their copyrights to SOCAN, while authors and publishers usually
give CANCOPY a non-exclusive mandate to license
reprographic uses. In the area of theatrical rights (‘‘grands
droits’’), the Collective Management Organization (e.g.,
SACD or SOCAD) is usually an agent who will negotiate
with the user on behalf of an author. Music publishers
represented by CMRRA only authorize that Agency to
act as their agent for certain uses (synchronization), but
in certain cases (Internet transmissions) may grant
CMRRA a right to license directly on their behalf. A sui
generis regime applies to non-member rightsholders,
who are given a right to the royalties based on an
approved tariff (section 76) or whose enforcement
options outside of the collective regime are limited to
those available within the regime. Finally, in the area of
retransmission rights, a legal licence is imposed and its
management can only be done through a CMO.

27
The same diversity of methods prevails around the
world. In the United States, antitrust constraints force all
Collective Management Organizations to operate as nonexclusive agents with a simple right to license. Since the
mandate given to a collective is non-exclusive and participation in a CMO is entirely voluntary, real blanket
licences are not available. Consequently, no CMO can
guarantee that it represents all the rightsholders concerned. At best, users obtain a repertory licence (i.e., a
licence covering a list of works and authorizing certain
acts, such as broadcasting or photocopying with respect
to such works). This also makes it more difficult to provide an indemnity to users. In Europe, a mandating
approach (i.e., a licence given by rightsholders) is the
most common one. It applies to Collective Management
Organizations in at least 12 of the 15 EU member countries (in nine of which the licence is exclusive). Collective
Management Organizations in at least nine EU countries
require a full assignment of rights. That is often the case
for music performing rights. 70 A sui generis rights acquisition model is used in Austria and Germany. 71 Senior
officials of the European Commission have indicated
that a directive on collective management of copyright
and related rights would be drafted in 2002, to harmonize this and other aspects of collective management
within the EU. 72 Given the time likely to be needed to
adopt a directive in this field and then its implementation by the EU member States, uniform EU legislation is
not expected until late 2004.
Because the German model may eventually be used
as a model for all of Europe, it is worth noting that in
Germany, Collective Management Organizations have
an obligation to administer rights in their field at the
request of any EU national. 73 They are also required to
‘‘grant exploitation rights or authorizations to any person
so requesting on equitable terms in respect of the rights
they administer’’. The German Act goes on to say:
‘‘should no agreement be reached with respect to the
amount of remuneration to be paid for the grant of
exploitation rights or of an authorization, the rights or
authorization shall be deemed to have been granted if
the remuneration demanded by the collecting society
has been paid subject to reservation or has been deposited in favour of the collecting society’’. 74
The duration of the authorization given to Collective Management Organizations varies. In Japan, the
members of CMOs in the neighbouring rights area must
by law have the freedom to withdraw. 75 In the EU, six
countries impose a maximum duration, which varies
from three to five years. 76 Taking into account the interests of rightsholders, it makes sense to allow them to
leave a Collective Management Organization. While, as a
matter of principle, one may argue that perpetual agreements should not be allowed, the essential point is
whether, and under what conditions, a rightsholder may
leave the system if the contract has no specific duration.
From the point of view of Collective Management Organizations, it is fair to ask that rightsholders give reason-
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able advance notice: the CMO’s repertory must maintain
a certain degree of predictability and stability in the eyes
of users, which would not be the case if rightsholders
constantly came in and out of the CMO.
The question whether rightsholders should be able
to join a CMO on a work-by-work basis is also relevant
in this context. On the one hand, professional (especially
corporate) rightsholders (e.g., publishers and producers)
may need to administer some of their rights outside of
the collective scheme. In most cases, a non-exclusive
arrangement with the Collective Management Organization allows them to do that. On the other hand, authors
(and performers) are often asked to create works or
deliver performances with a full transfer of all rights (and
a waiver of their moral right) to a buyer (‘‘all-rights contracts’’). Allowing those creators to leave the system,
work-by-work makes it possible for them to transfer
rights to a particular work, and for the entity commissioning the work to ask for the transfer. Hence, there is a
view that for the good of the creator community as a
whole, it would make sense to make it impossible for
individual creators to enter into these buy-out arrangements by imposing collective management.
While there is some logic to this argument, many
individual creators would argue that it is preferable to
maintain their freedom to choose and encourage instead
Collective Management Organizations to ‘‘sell’’ their services (including the advantages of collective management) to the rightsholders they want to represent. At the
same time, the CMO may warn authors of the pitfalls of
agreements made outside the collective scheme, namely
that authors may accept to sign a complete transfer of
their rights in exchange for a one-time fee that may in
the end be much less than they could otherwise have
gotten through their collective. Separate agreements and
free permissions may also weaken the value of the repertory and/or of the user’ needs that the CMO can fulfill. A
good example of a warning comes from the CANCOPY
website, which tells writers:
Please be prudent in granting free permissions. Some
users may interpret your permission as a lack of support for
the collective licensing system. As well, ‘‘free’’ permissions
make it difficult to argue that collective licensing is an equitable solution for all users. So, while it is possible to grant
free permissions, we request that, whenever possible, you
forward all requests to CANCOPY for processing. 77

An argument has also been made that the freedom
of association guaranteed by paragraph 2(d ) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms includes a right
not to associate. 78
In light of the above, it makes sense as a matter of
policy to encourage Collective Management Organizations to have rightsholder agreements with a maximum
duration (of, say, 3 to 5 years), including reasonable
notice of termination provisions. The duration of a contract varies according to the type of rights and more
importantly the type of licences (transactional or
blanket) that are granted by the CMO. Preventing workby-work withdrawals may work for creators collectively

but by the same token may be viewed as a restriction on
the freedom of individual creators.
Models of Legislative Support for Rights
Acquisition
The current system of collective management of
copyright and related rights 79 in Canada is by and large a
voluntary system. Authors and holders of neighbouring
rights can choose to participate in a collective scheme or
to form a collective of their own. While the Copyright
Act contains a number of provisions dealing with collective management, these usually only empower the Copyright Board to remedy failures in negotiations among
interested parties or otherwise set appropriate tariffs, 80 or
ensure transparency. 81 While similar measures may be
found in other national copyright laws, the Canadian Act
is original in the way it limits recourse available to
rightsholders who do not participate in a collective
scheme. 82 For example, section 76 of the Copyright Act
provides that an owner of copyright who does not
authorize a Collective Management Organization to collect royalties for that person’s benefit is only entitled to
be paid those royalties by the collective designated by
the Board subject to the same conditions as those to
which a person who has so authorized that collective is
subject. In a number of foreign jurisdictions, the law
provides support for or backup to the rights acquisition
process. This can be done in a number of ways: limiting
a non-represented rightsholder’s rights and recourses;
extending the rights of a Collective Management Organization to an entire class of works or uses once a certain
number of rightsholders have joined (with or without
opting out), a system known as extended collective
licensing; establishing a legal presumption that a Collective Management Organization has certain rights; or
making collective management mandatory.
The only such system in use in Canada is the legal
licence concerning ‘‘particular cases’’ (retransmission and
certain uses by educational institutions) in section 71,
and a limit on non-represented rightsholders rights
under section 76 concerning the right of a rightsholder
who does not participate in some collective schemes to
collect the royalties that he/she would have obtained
under the tariff. 83 This limit applies to the following
rights to remuneration: retransmission of a distant signal;
reproduction by an educational institution of a copy of a
news program (or documentary); public performance by
an educational institution of a news program; and copying or publicly performing by an educational institution of subject matter already communicated to the
public by telecommunication. The key for the application of subsection 76(2) is the existence of an approved
and effective tariff ‘‘that is applicable to that kind of work
or other subject matter’’. 84 It should also be noted that a
similar exclusion applies to enforcement proceedings
concerning private copying of sound recordings, but this
does not concern licensing proper, 85 because private copying levies are a form of compensation for copying that is
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not illegal (under Part VIII of the Act) and/or is untraceable; such levies are not a licence. 86 In a related field, the
Status of the Artist Act 87 provides that a certified artists’
association has ‘‘the exclusive authority to bargain on
behalf of artists in the sector’’. 88 Furthermore, only one
association may be present in each sector.
The most common techniques used in foreign
countries include: implied licences, legal presumptions,
mandatory collective management and so-called
‘‘extended collective licensing’’ system.
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Implied Licence/Indemnity 89
When the law contains an indemnity/implied
licence, the legislator limits the recourse available to a
rightsholder not covered by the collective scheme or,
from the user’s perspective, his/her potential liability.
This gives users the ‘‘peace of mind’’ to continue using
the works contained in the licensed repertory without
having to check beforehand whether an individual work
is in fact contained in such repertory. 90 It is, therefore, a
measure that may be perceived as being favourable to
users. A good example of this technique is contained in
paragraph 136(2)(b) of the U.K. Copyright Design and
Patents Act, 91 which includes an implied indemnity for
any act apparently covered by a collective licence. The
indemnity mechanism is a measure that, at least on the
surface, may seem quite favourable to users. However, it
goes against the principle that underlies all forms of
collective licensing, namely that the Collective Management Organization should acquire the proper licensing
authority from the rightsholders concerned (by assignment, as an agent, etc.). By using an indemnity, the legislator recognizes that uses do occur outside the scope of
the licence but then limits available recourses. In that
sense, it resembles a compulsory licence. Such licences
are subject to stringent international obligations (as will
be explained below). In addition, a user may in good
faith believe that her/his licence covers works or uses
that in fact are not covered due to the vagueness of
concepts such as that of ‘‘apparent licence’’. There are
better ways to facilitate the rights acquisition process and
to allow Collective Management Organizations to offer
users a licence with the broad coverage they want.

Legal Presumption
The legal presumption greatly accelerates the acquisition of rights because it reverses the burden of proof on
the user to show that the Collective Management Organization does not hold the right to license. Naturally, if
the presumption is not rebuttable, the system may then
resemble a compulsory licence, especially if rightsholders
cannot opt out. Paragraph 13(b)(2) of the German
Administration of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights
Act 92 contains an interesting model for a legal presumption.

Mandatory Collective Management
Collective licensing is often made directly
mandatory (as opposed to a presumption or implied
licence system). In the case of private copying levies and
public lending, a collective system seems inevitable,
although it need not be done through a Collective Management Organization, because private use/copying
levies do not constitute licensing per se but are rather
intended to compensate rightsholders for activities that
usually cannot be licensed. Other cases where collective
licensing was made mandatory in foreign countries
include the artist’s resale right (‘‘droit de suite’’), 93 public
lending, 94 private copying, 95 and retransmission. 96 As a
matter of principle, collective management should only
be compulsory when there is no other way to exercise
the right. In all other cases, rightsholders should have a
choice.

Extended Collective Licensing
One of the most interesting techniques is to combine a voluntary licence, which ensures the legitimacy of
the Collective Management Organization with a legal
‘‘ extension ’’ of the repertory to non-represented
rightsholders. In other words, this system involves the
establishment of a legal back-up licence, which simplifies
and accelerates the rights acquisition process and is
known as extended collective licensing. Such a system
might work well for a number of Canadian collectives
currently struggling to acquire both domestic and foreign rights. In the meantime, they are losing credibility
in the eyes of user groups to whom they are unable to
offer licences. Under this system, used mostly in
Northern Europe, as soon as a substantial number of
rightsholders of a certain category agree to participate in
a collective scheme, the scheme is automatically
extended not only to other national rightsholders in
works of the same category, but to all foreign ones as
well. Sections 36 and 38 of the Norwegian Copyright
Act 97 establish such a regime. In Sweden, paragraph 26(i )
of the Copyright Act 981960: 729, of December 30, 1960,
as amended up to January 1, 1996. provides for a similar
result, although Royal Assent does not seem necessary.
Article 15(a) of the Icelandic Copyright Act 99 provides for
an extension similar to that contained in Swedish law,
but adds an opt-out clause. An extended collective
system also exists in Denmark. 100
It is worth noting that an almost identical result is
reached when a copyright tribunal or board determines
that only a particular Collective Management Organization should act in a certain field, because that determination is usually based on the fact that the CMO represents
a considerable or substantial number of the rightsholders concerned.
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The implied licence system creates potential uncertainty around the introduction of the concept of
‘‘apparent licence’’ and resembles a compulsory licence.
In fact, this British system is probably not a model in this
field given the number of long and protracted cases
brought before the U.K. Copyright Tribunal. New compulsory regimes should only be established in areas
where the individual exercise of rights is impossible.
Even in these cases, a combination of rightsholders’
needs and user/market forces should lead to the creation
of the necessary collectives. Where the individual exercise of rights is possible (though perhaps not desirable),
mandatory collective management can be perceived as a
serious encroachment or restriction on the freedom of
rightsholders, and as a form of compulsory licensing,
implying that it must be compatible with Canada’s international treaty obligations (especially Article 9(2) of the
Berne Convention). The presumption system works well
in Germany, but does not have the same degree of legitimacy that follows from voluntary or extended licensing.
It is preferable to let rightsholders concerned (at the very
least a substantial number of them) decide whether a
particular CMO should be authorized to represent them.
A system of extended collective licensing seems to
work best in countries where (a) rightsholders are fairly
well informed and organized and (b) a significant proportion of the material comes from foreign countries,
because foreign rights acquisition is usually even more
difficult and time-consuming. In the field where the
system is most widely used, namely reprography, Scandinavia is by far the most successful part of the world both
in terms of coverage and collections. Such a system could
be of interest to Canadian rightsholders, users and Collective Management Organizations in certain fields. It
would offer several advantages. First and foremost, it
greatly accelerates and reduces the cost of the rights
acquisition process for both new and ‘‘old’’ Collective
Management Organizations. Older CMOs can use it to
acquire new rights to offer new (e.g., digital) licences.
This, in turn, means that the Collective Management
Organization is able to offer users a licence covering a
much broader repertory, with greater certainty and
much more rapidly. It is also consistent with the principle that a Collective Management Organization should
acquire the rights it wishes to license. It does not force
rightsholders to participate; they may opt out of the
collective system. In reality, however, the biggest hurdle
that a Collective Management Organization generally
faces is not rightsholders who clearly decide they do not
want the system, but rather those who are not aware of
the existence of the system and cannot be easily reached
or who for one reason or another have failed to decide
whether to participate. It is far better than a presumption
system because it only applies once a substantial number
of rightsholders of the category concerned have joined.
Finally, it is not restricted by the international rules that
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govern compulsory licensing (provided rightsholders can
opt out).
Canadian Collective Management Organizations
should not be forced to use extended collective licensing.
Instead, organizations that wish to do so should be given
the option of using it. It is similarly important to allow
rightsholders who wish to opt out to do so, although
their recourse could be limited to claiming the amount
otherwise available under the collective scheme. This is
important both under national law, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 101 and because
without opting out, the system resembles a non-voluntary licence and may have to comply with all applicable
international rules in this area, notably Article 9(2) of the
Berne Convention, which was incorporated by reference
into the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Article 9).
In summary, an extended collective licensing system
could accelerate the rights acquisition process in newer
areas of rights management, such as electronic (digital)
uses of protected material while respecting rightsholders
who do not wish to participate in the system; and be of
great benefit to users, because they get the assurance that
the repertory of works they are paying for is indeed
complete. In areas where it applies, it would also replace
the system of rightsholders who cannot be located. (The
system is currently managed by the Copyright Board, 102
which could then use its resources in other ways). Such a
system should be applicable first and foremost to blanket
(repertory) licensing environments. In the case of transactional (work-by-work) licensing, the system could be
used efficiently where prices are identical and no negotiation is possible. It may be inappropriate to use this
legislative technique to allow Collective Management
Organizations to negotiate individual transactional
licences on behalf of individual rightsholders (e.g., for
rightsholders who cannot be located), unless a regulatory
mechanism ensures transparency. One could insist that a
copy of any negotiated transactional licence on behalf of
non-member rightsholders be filed with the Copyright
Board.
To introduce such a system in Canada, a number of
legislative changes would be necessary, including the
establishment of the extended licence itself, perhaps
along the lines of section 36 of the above-mentioned
Norwegian Copyright Act, with a clear opt-out clause
added. A solution would also have to be found to situations in which two Collective Management Organizations license the same type of works for the same type of
use. One option would be for each Collective Management Organization to ‘‘notify’’ its Canadian and foreign
repertory to the other, thereby excluding it from the
notified CMO’s repertory (because rightsholders who
have entrusted their rights to the notifying Collective
Management Organization would be considered to have
opted out of the notified CMO’s licensing scheme). In
practice, this would mean that two Collective Management Organizations would represent rightsholders that
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did not expressly join one of the two collectives (directly
or through an agreement with a foreign CMO). This
would thus not be a huge problem once most (and
probably all significant rightsholders, including foreign
ones) have joined one of the two. Clearly, however, the
situation would work better if the two Collective Management Organizations were able to agree on a mutually
acceptable modus vivendi.
Our analysis of rights acquisition mechanisms has
shown that there may be an interest in exploring further
the application of the extended collective system to at
least some Canadian Collective Management Organizations. We now turn to the appropriate level of State
control of the operations of Collectives.
State Control of the Operations of Collective
Management Organizations

Canada
Control by the State of Collective Management
Organizations is not new, though its form and scope vary

greatly from country to country. In Canada, following
the establishment of the Canadian Performing Right
Society (CPRS) and investigations, first by Mr. Justice
Erwing in 1932 103 and then the Parker Commission in
1935, it has been recognized, at least with respect to
music performing rights, that the activities of Collective
Management Organizations may affect the public
interest. As Chief Justice Duff wrote in 1943:
It is of first importance, in my opinion, to take notice of
this recognition by the legislature of the fact that these
dealers in performing rights (i.e., the societies) which rights
are the creature of statute, are engaged in a trade which is
affected with a public interest and may, therefore, conformably to a universally accepted canon, be properly subjected
to public regulation. 104

In fact, Canada was the first country to impose a
statutory mechanism for the fixation of licence fees in
1936. 105
The various forms of control of CMOs in Canada
may be summarized as follows:
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Table 2: Existing Control of CMOs Under Canadian Law
Activity

Control

Formation

None specifically. General laws (corporations, competition) may
apply.

Operations

Licences by CMOs

No direct supervision. Information (and direction) may be
provided by CMOs as part of Copyright Board proceedings.
CMOs must answer requests for information about their
repertoire. 106
Government intervention through subsidies.
Copyright Board (filing of agreements and supervision /
determination of tariffs)

Licensing practices

Possible interventions under the Competition Act.
However, agreements filed with the Copyright Board not subject
to section 45 of the Competition Act (subsection 70.5(3) of the
Copyright Act).

Tariffs

Copyright Board (mandatory / optional)

Relations with users/exceptions

Possible arbitration by the Copyright Board (section 70.2)

Let us now see how this level of control compares
with the situation in key foreign countries.

United States
The U.S. Copyright Act does not regulate formation
of and participation by rightsholders in a collective
scheme. Though the Copyright Act is basically silent on
this point, the Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998 107
amended section 101 of the Act by adding a definition
of ‘‘performing rights society’’. This definition is only
used in the context of the interactive transmission
right. 108 Where a compulsory licence applies, the Copyright Office can establish Copyright Arbitration Royalty
Panels (CARPs) to determine ‘‘reasonable terms and rates
of royalty payments’’. 109 In fact, there is no regulation
concerning formation or governance of Collective Management Organizations as such. They can be for-profit,
though, that is the exception. While certain U.S. collectives have a fairly traditional board of directors (from the

perspective of other countries) composed of authors and
publishers (e.g., ASCAP), others have a board composed
entirely of ‘‘users’’ (BMI’s Board is composed entirely of
broadcasters), while still others have authors, publishers
and users on their Board (e.g., Copyright Clearance
Center (CCC), a CMO in the field of reprography). 110
The two principal U.S. performing rights societies
(ASCAP and BMI) are subject to ‘‘consent decrees’’. These
decrees are judicial decisions that govern their operations
and which are ‘‘negotiated’’ with the U.S. Department of
Justice (DoJ) under antitrust laws and then given the
force of a judicial decision by a federal court. 111 The
most recent ASCAP decree, though much less constraining than the previous one, still establishes a rate
court to adjudicate disputes with users on tariffs and
licensing conditions. It also governs certain aspects of
distribution, imposes transparency obligations concerning the repertory and gives the DoJ access to the
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premises of ASCAP and to documents as well as the right
to interview employees and request reports. 112 Even
though it is not copyright-specific, the U.S. system of
regulation of Collective Management Organizations
imposes a significant degree of control over the two
performing rights CMOs. To avoid being considered
monopolistic, Collective Management Organizations
may apply to the DoJ for a ‘‘business review letter’’,
which will state that a CMO is not violating antitrust
legislation if it continues doing business as stated in the
letter. 113 This is the case of, inter alia, CCC. 114 In the U.S.,
CMOs may also be asked to register for the right to
collect under certain compulsory licences. 115
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Japan
In Japan, the Agency for Cultural Affairs maintains
an oversight authority over all Collective Management
Organizations under the Law on Intermediary Business
concerning Copyrights. The extent of this authority is
not clear, but in practice the Agency is closely involved
in matters concerning collective management of rights. A
prior approval procedure for the formation of new collectives is in place.
Europe
Within the European Union, the level of State control over Collective Management Organizations varies
greatly. In at least 11 of the 15 EU countries, prior
approval is necessary to begin operating as a CMO,
although in five of those (Denmark, Finland, France, Italy
and the Netherlands), only certain collectives are concerned. A registration procedure is provided in Ireland
and Portugal, while no control exists in Sweden and the
U.K. 116 When prior approval is required, most often the
task belongs to the Ministry of Culture or a cultural
entity. There are other options, however: in Germany,
the responsibility lies with the Patent Office; in Austria,
with the Ministry of Education; in Belgium, with the
Ministry of Justice and in Luxembourg, with the Ministry of Finance. Twelve of the 15 EU member countries
have given a branch of government the authority to
monitor some or all of the Collective Management Organizations operating on their territory. In five of those
countries (Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands), the supervisory authority can routinely
attend decision-making meetings. Generally, however,
the supervision is limited to the communication of relevant documents. 117 In four countries (Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands), the distribution
plan of some or all Collective Management Organizations must be approved; however, once approved can no
longer be questioned. In six countries (Austria, Belgium,
France, Germany, Greece and Spain), the government
can reprimand or ‘‘penalize’’ a CMO.
Some of the models used in Europe are worth
exploring in greater detail. France introduced fairly
extensive control of the operations of Collective Management Organizations in the year 2000. Until August 2000,
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there was very little control over Collective Management
Organizations: approval of new CMOs by the Minister of
Culture, 118 an obligation to appoint an auditor, 119 and an
obligation to put their repertory at the disposal of
users. 120 A Collective Management Organization also
had to provide the Minister of Culture with annual
accounts and any proposal to modify its statutes, at least
two months before the General Assembly was convoked. 121 Amongst the changes introduced on August 1,
2000 (Law No. 2000-719) 122 was the creation of a commission composed of five members with full authority
and access to all documents, data and software used by a
Collective Management Organization, and even the right
to ask questions of a collective’s auditors, whose confidentiality obligation was suspended in such a case. 123
Failure by a Collective Management Organization manager to respond to an inquiry may result in the imposition of a fine of 100,000 FF (approximately
CDN$21,000) and/or one-year imprisonment. Members
(rightsholders) of a Collective Management Organization
also have a right to obtain specific information from
their Collective Management Organization. 124 The application of the new system is too recent to determine its
efficacy. The previous control system in France was
based solely on the application of competition rules and
may offer the best example of why these rules by themselves sometimes fail to work. The association of discotheque owners in France launched a series of legal
battles both in French and European courts, arguing that
SACEM (the French performing rights collective) was
abusing its monopolistic position and violating a
number of other competition rules, including Articles 81
and 82 125 of the EU’s main legal document, the Treaty of
Rome. More than 1,000 legal decisions were rendered,
including several by the French Supreme Court. 126
Although SACEM won almost all its cases, it had to
expend enormous resources to fight these battles and
rightsholders ended up losing a considerable amount of
royalties.
In Germany, Collective Management Organizations
are governed by the Administration of Copyright and
Neighbouring Rights Act, 127 perhaps the most extensive
model of sector-specific State control of the operations of
a Collective Management Organization anywhere in the
world. Under sections 2–4 of this Act, the German
Patent Office (Patentamt) must approve the formation of
a Collective Management Organization and can revoke
said authorization at any time. Under this Act, the Patent
Office may appoint board members of any CMO 128 and
revoke any ‘‘person entitled by law or the statutes to
represent a collecting society [who] does not possess the
trustworthiness needed for the exercise of his activity;
the supervisory authority shall set a date for him to be
relieved from his post to avoid revocation of authorization under Article 4(1). The supervisory authority may
forbid him to exercise his activity further pending expiry
of the time limit where necessary to prevent serious
detriment’’. 129 The Act imposes a duty to administer
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rights upon request from a qualified rightsholder (EU
national) and must provide information on its activities. 130 By law, each Collective Management Organization must also ‘‘set up welfare and assistance schemes for
the holders of the rights and claims that they administer’’. 131 While the Act does not prevent the formation of
more than one society in a given field, at present there is
only one Collective Management Organization in each
field. Each German Collective Management Organization is therefore in a de facto monopoly situation.
In Italy, the Authors’ Society (SIAE) has been a
monopoly since 1941 in the field of authors’ rights. It is
controlled by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.
Section 180 of the Copyright Act 132 guarantees the
monopoly. A new Italian Collective Management Organization called IMAIE was established to administer the
secondary use rights of performers and producers of phonograms. The Government appoints part of IMAIE’s
board. A third collective, known as AIDRO, was set up to
administer reprographic royalties. 133
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Analysis
The question of the control of the operations of
Collective Management Organizations by the State boils
down to a fundamental policy question: do Collective
Management Organizations perform a ‘‘public’’ function? Given the fact that Collective Management Organizations handle substantial funds that belong to third
parties, should rightsholders be treated as bank customers, in the sense that only approved (e.g., chartered)
banks can operate as such? It is certainly true that most
financial intermediaries are licensed and sometimes
extensively regulated by the State. However, contrary to
most financial intermediaries, Collective Management
Organizations are often owned and/or controlled by the
rightsholders they represent. In addition, most Collective
Management Organizations consider that they play a
cultural role in addition to acting as financial
intermediaries. Treating Collective Management Organizations to a certain extent as entities playing a ‘‘public’’
role, and consequently imposing a certain right to
oversee their operations, may lead to greater credibility
because users who know that Collective Management
Organizations are subject to certain obligations may find
it easier to deal with them. By the same token,
‘‘approved’’ CMOs may find that it is easier to negotiate
and/or enforce the rights entrusted to them. In other
words, regulated Collective Management Organizations
could gain a certain degree of additional institutional
recognition. On the other hand, most CMOs operated as
private associations of rightsholders and their business is
(presumably) well supervised by the rightsholders who
serve on their boards, many of whom would no doubt
argue that the government has no business controlling
what they do or how they do it.
There is no easy answer to or unanimity of views on
this question, including among the collectives them-

selves. On several occasions, including before the Legal
Advisory Board (LAB) of the European Commission, representatives of German Collective Management Organizations (as explained above, German law provides for
extensive state control of CMOs) advocated State control
of the activities of collectives within the EU. They argued
it gave them legitimacy and credibility. In addition, in
‘‘exchange’’ for the control, the law made it more difficult to question tariffs or distribution plans. Several Collective Management Organizations from other countries
opposed any intervention by individual member States
or the EU Commission.
In Canada, there are a number of instances of complaints about the actual operations of Collective Management Organizations, but those complaints usually deal
with tariffs (usually a matter for the Board) or lack of
repertoire (a rights acquisition problem). Thus, massive
state intervention is not required. As noted above, there
is already a degree of state control: certain Collective
Management Organizations must, under certain circumstances, provide the Copyright Board with copies of their
licences, and often also other information about their
activities, e.g., in the course of hearings. If additional measures are taken to support Collective Management Organizations in their rights acquisition efforts in Canada, it
may make sense to introduce minimal state supervision
of those Collective Management Organizations that wish
to benefit from any special rights acquisition regime,
including transparency or registration obligations. The
purpose would be to ensure that all rightsholders,
including those that are not a member of the CMO but
whose rights are managed by the Collective Management Organizations under the extended licence, have
access to the necessary information (management,
finances, etc.) about the organizations administering
their rights.
Control of Prices (Tariffs) and Licensing Practices
Let us now examine the various legal systems in
place to control the tariffs applied by Collective Management Organizations.

Control Only Under Competition/Antitrust Laws
This is the system in place in the United States, for
example. Under the consent decrees that govern the
operations of ASCAP and BMI (see previous section), a
federal judge acts as a ‘‘rate court’’ in case of a dispute
between one of these Collective Management Organizations and a user or user group. 134 In the case of nonvoluntary licences, the U.S. Copyright Act provides the
Copyright Office with the authority to convene the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) to determine
the appropriate tariff. 135 To our knowledge, this system is
not in existence in any other country and depends too
much on the special characteristics of the U.S. legal
system to be of any direct use or application in Canada.
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The Canadian system of control by a specialized
administrative tribunal 136 of the tariffs and other conditions 137 of repertory (blanket) licences and rights to
remuneration is fairly common, although the exact procedures and scope of the powers of equivalent control
entities followed in each country vary greatly. Tribunal
and specialized boards most often have a jurisdiction
confined to tariffs, and/or cases where collective management is mandatory. 138 A role over other disputes exists
only in the laws of Austria, Finland and the Netherlands.
In other foreign laws and practices, arbitration and mediation, generally on an entirely voluntary basis, often
work side-by-side with a more formal system. A recent
Deloitte & Touche report 139 noted that, in many of these
countries, the system is seldom used. In Germany, an
arbitration board may be set up under section 14 of the
Administration of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights
Act. 140 This excludes action before the courts until an
arbitral decision is rendered. 141 The Act also mandates
publication of tariffs and instructs CMOs to ‘‘have due
regard to the religious, cultural and social interests of the
persons liable to pay the remuneration, including the
interests of youth welfare’’. 142 A Copyright Licensing Tribunal exists in Denmark to set prices for compulsory
licences. 143
There is no compelling evidence of a need to
change the role of the Copyright Board in any major
way. 144 However, certain changes and enhancements
could be envisaged, including the introduction of an
upstream Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) procedure. Such a mediation system exists in Denmark, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. Ad hoc
commissions of rightsholders and users play a similar
role in Austria, Germany, Finland and Luxembourg. 145
Internal mediation (between rightsholders and the
CMO) is in place in Denmark, 146 France, 147 and Portugal. 148 Mediation is also part of European law: the
Directive on Cable and Satellite 149 makes possible
recourse to a mediator to negotiate retransmission royalties. 150 The Copyright Board already has an arbitration
role between Collective Management Organizations and
individual users (in section 70.2), but it is still fairly
formal in nature. The establishment of a voluntary mediation system should be considered. There are many ways
in which this could be implemented. Perhaps a mediation procedure could be adopted as regulations under
the existing paragraph 66.6(1)(a) of the Act. Issues to
examine further include the way in which the public
interest would be taken into account; whether the mediator would report to the Board and in which way; how
an agreement reached during mediation feeds into the
Board’s formal decision-making process (presumably as
agreements do under the existing provisions); who
would act as mediator (presumably not Board members,
but external experts); the secrecy or reusability of submissions made during the mediation process (normally,
these submissions are made without prejudice to any
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further process and cannot be used against the party that
made them); and whether ADR would slow down the
existing process. If the ADR process were voluntary (i.e.,
both sides must agree), this problem would be less critical. In addition, safeguards (e.g., provisional tariffs)
should be included to avoid this result.
Another aspect to consider is the status of agreements. In Germany, for example, where state control of
Collective Management Organizations is extensive,
CMOs must publish their tariffs but are always free to
agree on different terms with users. For example, a 20%
discount is generally given when an arrangement can be
made with an association of users on behalf of its members. 151 In fact, we found no legislation that prevents
individual agreements or makes them subject to
mandatory approval, except in cases where collective
management is mandatory. As a matter of policy, Collective Management Organizations and users should be
allowed to conclude agreements that take precedence
over tariffs (if any), whether before, during or after the
tariff fixing process. 152 An exception could be made for
cases where collective management is mandatory.
Distributions and Accounts
In Canada, distribution of royalties by CMOs is usually done on the basis of usage surveys (e.g., music performing rights), work-by-work (e.g., mechanical rights) or
on a different basis that combines survey or other usage
data with other criteria (e.g., private copying). There are
no specific legal requirements in Canadian law concerning the distribution of royalties, except with respect
to non-members. That is the case in most other countries. 153 Exceptions include Germany where, under the
Administration of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights
Act, 154 ‘‘a collecting society shall distribute the revenue
from its activities according to fixed rules (distribution
plan) that prevent any arbitrary act of distribution. The
distribution plan shall conform to the principle that culturally important works and performances are to be promoted. The principles of the distribution plan shall be
incorporated in the statutes of collecting societies’’. 155
German Collective Management Organizations must
establish a pension fund for their members. 156 Additionally, a distribution ‘‘plan’’ filed with the supervisory
authority (Patent Office) can no longer be contested
once approved. In the Netherlands, the distribution plan
of those CMOs whose management is supervised by the
State (i.e., music CMOs and those whose role is
mandatory) must be submitted to and approved by the
Minister. 157 In several national laws, distribution is regulated to the extent that part of the funds collected must
be used for ‘‘collective purposes’’. For example, in Denmark, one-third of the private copying levies must be
used for such purposes. 158 In the United States, no standard distribution scheme is provided and funds collected
are generally paid to those who hold rights to a work.
There are no restrictions on transfers. That said, in certain cases, standard market practices have developed,
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such as in the music area, where standard splits apply to
most author-publisher agreements.
We found no compelling evidence of a need to
incorporate distribution rules in the Act itself. However,
difficulties in this area have been mentioned concerning
the distribution by the so-called ‘‘umbrella’’ collectives.
The Copyright Board did not set the distribution rules
for those rights as it did for private copying levies (as is
required by law). 159 It may make sense to provide
rightsholders with recourse to the Board to examine
distribution systems also for rights to remuneration.
Other than as mentioned in the previous sentence, the
distribution of funds is best left to the organizations and
rightsholders concerned. The same applies to the use of
funds for general or cultural purposes.
Another aspect of distribution is the use of nondistributable funds. Probably all Collective Management
Organizations administering a repertory licence may
from time to time receive funds that cannot be distributed according to their distribution plan, often because
the rightsholder cannot be located. We found no major
problem in that regard in Canada, and no uniform or
dominant solution in foreign countries. There are a few
examples of laws that require the use of those funds for a
specific purpose. For example, under French law, funds
received by Collective Management Organizations in
cases where collective management is mandatory
(reprography, retransmission, private copying) that could
not be distributed 10 years from the date at which they
could first have been paid out must be used in their
entirety for activities that support artistic creation. In
addition, 50% of the non-distributable royalties received
by neighbouring rights Collective Management Organizations must be used ‘‘to promote creation, to promote
live entertainment and trainee activities for performers’’. 160 However, this is more an exception than the
rule, and this matter is generally not regulated in
national laws. The crucial issue is transparency.

Rights Management in the Digital
Age
Background: Copyright in the Digital
Age 161

A

few years ago, it was trendy to suggest that copyright and the World Wide Web went together like
fire and water. As a result, copyright would soon either
evaporate or be extinguished. 162 Over the past two years,
the increasing bandwidth and user base of the Internet
as well as powerful new compression algorithms have
made it possible to download and use new types of
works. PDF 163 published texts, MP3 164 files and, now,
high-quality commercial video files. The most talkedabout phenomenon is still music, notably due to MP3
technology and its use by file-exchange services such as
Napster, although sites such as iCraveTV and JumpTV
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have drawn much attention to the phenomenon of
video streaming. Will peer-to-peer technology and other
forms of online transmission and exchange be the death
knell of copyright as we know it? 165 The answer depends
in large part on how fast the so-called ‘‘content industries’’ are able to provide business models in tune with
the demands of the various user communities. Chances
are that copyright will survive. But the way in which it is
used and administered will change. Some of the traditional exclusive rights used to prohibit use of protected
material are much more difficult to apply to the Internet
environment. Even if technology allows rightsholders to
prevent copying and/or online distribution and sharing,
in some cases, overprotection may lead to consumer/user dissatisfaction and, paradoxically, lower revenues. Yet, when properly applied, the copyright ‘‘concept ’’ is still the best basis to claim financial
compensation and organize markets — two essential
tools for creators, performers, publishers and producers.
To protect content on the Internet, a number of
‘‘secure’’ initiatives, sometimes referred to as ‘‘rights management systems’’, have been proposed and several systems are in advanced ‘‘beta testing’’ phase or already in
the active commercialization phase. These technologies
are used to prevent unauthorized access to the material,
prevent unauthorized reproduction (copying) or distribution or both. To name but one example, the Secure
Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) 166 is building ‘‘a voluntary, open framework for playing, storing, and distributing digital music in a protected form’’. 167 In the text
world, companies such as Calgary-based Rightsmarket, 168
CyVeillance 169 and Intertrust 170 are marketing technology that prevents reuse of online content (except as
authorized at the time the content was acquired). This
may take the form of a ‘‘container’’ in which digital
content is delivered or a watermark to track content
posted on (publicly-available) Web sites. The protection
technology checks for authorization before providing
access to the protected content or allowing the user to
make or send a copy. The need to balance a high level of
protection with users’ needs is (officially) recognized by
all these technology companies. 171 Whether they succeed
as intermediaries will ultimately depend on users’ reaction and acceptance level.
While music is on the front lines, text publishers
were the first in the digital trenches. Their content takes
up fewer bytes (even in PDF) and can be copied and
disseminated easily even with (relatively) low-speed
Internet access, such as with 56.6K modems. Yet, several
large publishing houses now offer very high-quality content over the Web. For example, readers of scientific,
technical and medical literature can find thousands of
high-quality journals offered online (usually in addition
to the paper copy): Academic Press’s IDEAL, 172 Science
Magazine, 173 Elsevier’s Science Direct 174 and SpringerVerlag’s LINK, 175 along with dozens of other systems.
Magazine and newspaper publishers are following the
same path, with major newspapers in many countries
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available online in full text, often on the same day as the
paper publication. One advantage often mentioned by
users of the online version is that they can be wordsearched, and archives are often searchable as well. If
providing online access to content was supposed to torpedo copyright as we know it, these ‘‘content providers’’
would all be dead by now!
The business models that support the delivery of
online content vary greatly. Some models, often advertising-based, have material available that can be searched
and downloaded for free without having to identify oneself. However, in light of the rapid drop in advertising
revenue, material will be offered only after the user has
registered. This process provides content owners and service providers with valuable demographic and other
market information and allows them to compile possible
e-mail lists for future direct marketing efforts. In other
cases, while an abstract or a few seconds of the song is
used to illustrate the content (‘‘teaser’’), fees are charged
to download the full text or song. Other providers prefer
a subscription model which, for the print world, can be a
subscription to the electronic version only, or combined
with a paper subscription (in some cases, the electronic
version is offered as a ‘‘bonus’’ for subscribers to the
paper version). What is common among most content
providers, however, is that the material provided online
is almost always subject to a ‘‘mouse-click contract’’ (also
referred to as a ‘‘click-wrap’’ contract) and/or terms and
conditions limiting what the user can legally do with the
material. Such restrictions typically limit use to a single
user and allow that user only to read/listen (and possibly
print) a single copy. Redistribution or reuse of the material is generally prohibited. While in the world of text
publishing (newspapers, journals and magazines), this is
still done on an honour basis (based on law and contract); other industries seem to prefer technical solutions,
such as digital containers and encryption systems to
enforce these terms and conditions.
Preventing any and all use and reuse of the material
may not be possible. In fact, it may not be desirable. In
other words, locking up digital content is not necessarily
the best option. Instead, a properly organized licensing
market, where users can painlessly and quickly obtain
the rights they need (within reasonable limits and
respecting moral rights) is a far better solution than
locking everything up. Very often (especially in a business-to-business (B2B) environment), users want more
rights after having received and reviewed the content.
For example, a company may find a newspaper or
journal article they would like to e-mail to customers,
post to an Intranet or publish in their corporate newsletter. They don’t know this before reading the article
(i.e., at the time of the acquisition of the content). These
new needs are prompting rightsholders and the Collective Management Organizations that represent them to
offer reasonably flexible licensing options. Yet, while
complex transactional licensing seems to make sense in a
B2B digital environment, most users probably still prefer
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the convenience of repertory licensing, even if more
detailed reporting of use may be possible in a digital
environment. Collective Management Organizations can
offer users another significant advantage: by aggregating
usage data in the way it is reported to rightsholders, they
protect the confidentiality of usage data (for business
users) and the privacy of consumers. Independently of
the model chosen, one point remains: to be able to
license online, quickly and efficiently, an Electronic
Copyright Management System (ECMS) is indispensable.

The Technology for Digital Copyright
Management
Before we can understand electronic copyright
management systems, we need to understand the concepts that underlie such systems, starting with ‘‘rights
management’’ itself, from a more technical perspective.
Copyright Management Systems (CMS) are basically
databases that contain information about content
(works, discrete manifestations of works and related
products) and, in most cases, the author and other
rightsholders. That information is needed to support the
process of authorizing the use of those works by others.
A CMS thus usually involves two basic modules — one
for the identification of content and rightsholders, the
other for licensing (or, rarely, for other rights transactions, such as a full assignment). In many cases, ancillary
modules such as payment or accounts receivable are also
considered part of the system, but the core of a CMS is
content and rights identification and a licensing tool.
A Copyright Management System can be used by
individual rightsholders or by third parties who manage
rights on behalf of others. A rightsholder might use the
system to track a repertory of works, manifestations, or
products, or an organization representing a group of
rightsholders might use a CMS to track each rightsholder’s rights and works. Such an organization might
be a literary agent representing a number of writers, or,
more commonly, a Collective Management Organization.
Applying the above concepts, we see that rights
management functions are made much easier with computers, which can act both as huge rights databases and
automated licensing engines. Computerized systems
allow rightsholders to automatically grant licences to
users without human intervention, which has the benefit
of keeping transaction costs low and making licensing an
efficient, Internet-speed process: licences to use a specific
work can be granted online, 24 hours a day, to individual users. Ideally, such licences will be tailored to a
user’s needs. For example, a corporation may want to
post a flattering newspaper article on its Web site or send
it via e-mail to its customer base; an individual author
may decide to purchase the right to use an image, video
clip, or song to use in her/his own creative process; a
publishing house might purchase the right to reuse previously published material. Electronic Copyright Management Systems (ECMS) may also be used to deliver

✄ REMOVE

Username: chauhana

Date: 31-JUL-02

Time: 9:46

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\01_02_gervais.dat

Seq: 17

Collective Management of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights in Canada

content in cases where the user does not have access to
such content in the required format. Or they may be
used to create licensing sites or offer licensing options at
the point where the content is made available. Finally,
digital technology can also be used to track usage
(‘‘metering’’ and ‘‘monitoring’’), look for unauthorized
online uses (programs known as ‘‘spiders’’ scour the Web
looking for unauthorized copies of material on Web
sites) or to encrypt material in digital containers to limit
further uses of the material.
For transactional licences, an ECMS thus basically
acts as a licensing engine. There are various implementations of such systems that range in technical sophistication from the very basic to the very complex (and expensive). In the least sophisticated scenario, a user mails,
faxes, or e-mails a licence request to a collective management organization that processes it manually and returns
an answer to the user. In a slightly more automated
environment, the organization uses an electronic worksand-rights database, but still processes the licence request
manually. Another step up in the ladder of automation is
where an internal computer-based licensing system
processes the request. With a full ECMS, a user searches
available content and rights online, submits a licence
request electronically (usually via the World Wide Web)
and receives a response from the system without any
human intervention. A variation on this theme is where
the user first locates the content (using a search engine or
portal) and is then offered licensing options at the point
of content.

Overview of Current Digital Licensing
Efforts
In Canada, licensing of digital uses is not new.
SOCAN filed a tariff for the public performance of
music (known as ‘‘Tariff 22’’) and the Copyright Board
rendered a ‘‘Phase I’’ decision on legal issues. 176
SODRAC 177 and CMRRA have also filed tariffs concerning the reproduction of music in Internet transmissions and NRCC 178 with respect to the neighbouring
rights involved in the transmission. The case of iCraveTV
is also relevant in this context. It raised doubts about the
extent to which Internet transmissions of broadcasts
could qualify as ‘‘retransmissions’’ and consequently benefit from the non-licensing voluntary regime of section 31 of the Copyright Act. COPIBEC and CANCOPY
have already obtained the right to license certain digital
secondary uses of printed material from several member
rightsholders. Internationally, very few countries have
adopted compulsory licensing of digital uses. Such a
system exists in the Danish legislation but has yet to be
applied in practice. Another similar system is under consideration in Norway, in both cases only for reprography-type uses. Under the extended licensing system,
however, Northern European Collective Management
Organizations may gain the right to license digital uses
once they have been able to convince a substantial
number of their national rightsholders.
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Voluntary licensing of digital uses by Collective
Management Organizations is already in place in the
United States, in some cases on an experimental basis.
ASCAP and BMI, the two U.S. performing rights collectives, have tariffs relating to the public performance of
music on the Internet. 179 Fairly advanced in this field is
the U.S. CCC, which licenses reproduction of printed
material for inclusion in ‘‘digital coursepacks’’, reuse of
material on Web sites, Intranets, CD-ROMs and other
digital media under their Republication Licensing Service. CCC also offers a repertory-based licence for
internal digital reuse of material by corporate users.
Interestingly, in the latter program, users can only scan
material not made available by the publisher himself in
digital form. 180 CCC’s ability to license digital uses is
entirely based on voluntary and non-exclusive rights
transfers from rightsholders.
A number of multimedia initiatives are also
underway in Europe and Japan. In Japan, the government helped launch a project called J-CIS (Japan Copyright Information Service). This service would provide
information on copyrighted material of all types and
allow users to contact the current rightsholders directly
(or a competent CMO) to obtain necessary permissions.
Certain conditions of use may also be predetermined by
the rightsholder. 181
In Europe, the best example of an ECMS is probably
the Very Extensive Rights Data Information (VERDI)
project. Its aim is to build an infrastructure to license use
of multimedia content for European users and
rightsholders. VERDI partners include a number of key
European CMOs. The purpose of this ‘‘consortium’’ is to
pool (in a distributed fashion) existing rights and works
databases, link them to an online licensing engine, while
maintaining each partner’s role in acquiring rights from
local rightsholders and distributing collected royalties
and fees to those rightsholders. Content delivery will be
added at a later date. 182 VERDI partners could allow the
consortium to license on their behalf, or ask the consortium to forward a licensing request. In the latter case, the
request would either be dealt with by the CMO directly
or sent on to the rightsholder. The main advantage to
users would be the establishment of a one-stop-shop
(‘‘guichet unique’’) where they could obtain information
about protected material and have certain licences
granted on the spot as well as apply for licences for other
material. In several European countries, CMOs have created, or intend to create, a national one-stop-shop. Its
purpose would be to provide information on CMOs and
the services they offer, offer users an easier way to contact
CMOs and perhaps also receive ‘‘multimedia’’ clearance
requests that would then be forwarded on to the respective CMOs (which obviously requires staff). Examples
include the SESAM in France, 183 CEDAR in the Netherlands 184 and the CMMV in Germany. 185
The idea of creating a national information point
about Collective Management Organizations, as part of
an online information service about copyright and
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neighbouring rights, is undoubtedly a useful endeavour.
Yet, the general enthusiasm for multimedia rights
licensing centres seems to have waned. The production
of multimedia CD-ROMs is not a fast-growth sector. In
fact, several CD-ROMs are merely electronic
encyclopaedias. While rights clearance for encyclopaedia
has never been simple, before investing into an online
rights clearance system that would presumably cost millions, one would need to obtain additional data on its
potential usage and ensure that it is not built solely or
mainly for the benefit of encyclopaedia producers, a
market that, in spite of its undeniable value, may not
justify the expense or indeed the need for such a complex, automated rights clearance system.
The most promising sectors for copyright and
neighbouring rights clearance on the Internet are the
mass uses of music, text and video, and the licensing of
corporate and educational reuse of scientific, professional
and financial material. Internet-based usage of protected
content will require some degree of collective management of rights (as the Tariff 22 example demonstrates). It
is probably not up to Collective Management Organizations to put in place the technology to prevent reuse
(although some may wish to take part in that process),
but it could be in their interest to have access to monitoring tools. This explains why several collectives are
taking a keen interest in metadata 186 and identification
codes, 187 which are necessary to track material automatically. This information is generally referred to as ‘‘rights
management information’’. This expression is defined,
inter alia, in the U.S. Copyright Act 188 and in the European Union Directive on copyright and related rights in
the information society, 189 adopted in May 2001.
As a matter of policy, it would seem to make sense
to support and participate in the coordination of standardization efforts for metadata and digital identifiers.
This should include, as part of the implementation of
the two 1996 WIPO treaties (WCT and WPPT), 190 a
definition and appropriate protection of rights management information.

Rights Management Systems Needs of
Canadian Collective Management
Organizations
In terms of supporting digital licensing, Canadian
Collective Management Organizations should consider
obtaining the necessary rights from their members/rightsholders if they have not already done so. In
addition, to be optimally efficient and deal with digital
usage information, online member and work registration, user requests and online transactional licensing
(where such licensing on reasonably standard terms is
possible), Collective Management Organizations need a
rights management system with both an efficient backend system and a user-friendly Web front-end. However,
an all-encompassing online multimedia licensing system
operated jointly by all Canadian Collective Management
Organizations seems to be justified neither by licensing
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practices nor by prevailing market conditions. An information point should suffice. The problem is that the
sheer number of collectives in Canada far surpass the
number of similar organizations in any other country,
even those with far more population.
Table 3: Number of CMOs in Key Countries 191
Country

Number of CMOs

Canada

28/36 192

Denmark

7/14 193

France

7

Germany

9/14 194

Italy

3

Japan

6 195

Netherlands

13 196

Spain

7

United Kingdom

12

United States

8 197

While the existence of market forces and rightsholder choices may explain the high number of collectives in Canada, it is not economically feasible to build
an integrated (front-end/back-end) rights management
system for each of them. Clearly, some collectives have
rights management needs that can be met with a very
basic infrastructure. As a rule, however, to offer online
services and deal with online users and usage, including
rights management information, an efficient system is
required. That does not mean that to perform other
functions, the fractioning of the ‘‘CMO market’’ in
Canada is necessarily counter-productive. As noted
already, it is too early to draw such a conclusion.

Collective Licensing of Copyright in the
Digital Age
Copyright is at a crossroads: it must adapt to the
increasing needs and demands for legitimate online
access to protected works, especially materials used for
research and distance education and in particular scientific texts. There have been calls for its simplification by
reducing the number of rights in the bundle that we
now call copyright; 198 or by focusing on not more, but
different rights. 199 Will it be possible or even desirable to
keep material off the Internet when the Internet is omnipresent, linked to PDAs, watches, cell phones even home
appliances?; when all kinds of material will be available
on the Net (and oftentimes only on the Net)? By the
same token, however, all this material cannot be free. It
has been the rationale of all intellectual property rights
since at least the 17th century that a creator or inventor
who put her/his creation at the disposal of others should
get a fair reward. It is, in fact, a fundamental component
of societal and industrial innovation and creativity, at
least what we would call ‘‘organized creativity’’, i.e., the
creation of new, sometimes expensive literary and artistic
creations made available in professional quality to the
public. Not all creators want to get an economic reward,
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but most want recognition of authorship/attribution.
Copyright provides both. 200
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Against that backdrop, what is an author or other
owner of copyright to do when her/his creations will
almost inevitably find their way on the Net? One reaction, which the film and recording industry have clearly
decided to adopt, is to use all existing technological and
legal means to stop this ‘‘leakage’’ from traditional (physical) distribution chains in its tracks. That may stop or,
more realistically, contain some of the leakage, but if
users find the convenience of the Web to be such that
they want to make it a primary source of information,
those who use the approach just described will face
dwindling revenues, unless their material is of such high
quality and irreplaceable that users are forced to get it
through other (non-digital) means. But all these
approaches are bound to fail sooner or later: access on
the Internet will have to be organized and not simply
prevented. It is better, therefore, to allow access and
adopt a ‘‘licensing perspective’’.
The answer to the current quandary (users wanting
authorized access to copyright material being ‘‘forced’’ to
access illegally or at least not to access it digitally)
depends on how fast the so-called ‘‘content industries’’
are able to provide business models in tune with the
demands of the various user communities. 201 The
problem is caused essentially by the convergence of
three exponential curves: the number of users on the
Web; the number of rightsholders sharing the rights on a
copyright work, which may be split by type of right
(reproduction, communication, translation, etc.); and the
number of works and parts of works, including new
collections, databases and compilations made available
everyday on the Internet. The difficulty, time and costs
involved in trying to perform an individualized licensing
transaction for each use of each work (belonging to one
or several rightsholders in one or more countries) by
each user are astronomical. 202 Collective licensing allows
users to obtain general (blanket) licence to use a certain
type or material without having to obtain an individual
licence. It may also offer the possibility of obtaining an
individual licence for extraordinary (in the literal sense)
uses, thereby acting as a one-stop shop. In both cases, the
Collection Management Organization makes copyright
work in the digital age.
This allows us to draw a crucial distinction between
two legislative tools at Parliament’s disposal. First, Parliament may take away the rights of authors entirely, by
exempting certain acts that would otherwise require an
authorization from the author. Perhaps the best example
is the inclusion of those acts into the fair dealing sphere
although there are other types of exemptions in the
Act. 203 In other cases, Parliament may decide that it
would be impractical or unfair to require that an authorization be obtained and impose a compulsory licence: a
work covered by a compulsory licence may be used
without authorization, provided the tariff (if any) set by
the Copyright Board is paid. There is a fundamental
difference between these two tools, however. In one case,
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the author or other rightsholders might argue (assuming
copyright is a property right) 204 that they are expropriated without compensation (though ostensibly in the
public interest). Users might argue that in such a case,
the copyright monopoly is simply not extended into
areas where it does not belong. 205 But their claim is
usually that they need to access and use a work lawfully
and that in certain cases, obtaining a licence is either
impossible or completely impracticable. When a compulsory licence is in place, these ‘‘obstacles’’ are removed
and the issue then boils down to whether the authors
and other rightsholders should be financially compensated.
Collective management is a method, a tool that
rightsholders choose when the individual exercise of
their right(s) to authorize 2 0 6 is impracticable.
Rightsholders then choose to let users within a defined
group or category use their works and all those within a
repertory in exchange for a compensation set by mutual
agreement or by the Copyright Board. 207 A voluntary
collective system has the clear advantage of reducing the
legislative distortion of compulsory licensing which, in
addition, must be compatible with Canada’s obligations
under the Berne Convention and the WTO Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS Agreement). 208
While the purpose of this paper is not to argue for
or against new exemptions or compulsory licensing, as
an alternative to those, the government should consider
encouraging collective licensing to respond to the challenges posed to copyright holders and users by the
Internet. Whether for use of material in digital form by
educational institutions and businesses (by e-mail, on
their Intranets, etc.), or mass Internet transmissions of
music and audiovisual material (interactive or not), collective licensing offers a powerful way for rightsholders
to make available the rights to use their material, while
making it simple for users to get those rights. In other
words, it makes licensing better and more efficient. If
coupled with an efficient online licensing system (for
users) and registration/information (for rightsholders),
copyright can be well managed and used, and prove to
be the best way to protect ‘‘content’’ on the Internet and
other digital networks. If this approach and, where
appropriate, rights acquisition support that could take
the form of extended licensing were used, a system could
be in place rapidly and users could easily obtain licences
to meet their digital needs in the copyright area.
Without adequate licensing options for digital and
other types of content, users will continue to demand
access and, if no proper licensing is available, may feel
justified in asking Parliament for an extension of fair
dealing and/or a specific exemption from copyright. This
would hurt Canadian authors, creators and the copyright
industries who, for the most part, are willing to give
organized access to copyright material on the Web provided a proper licensing and, where appropriate, payment mechanism is in place, perhaps coupled with technological measures of protection.
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igital technology is a very unique and powerful
medium. It allows all kinds of copyrighted material
to be stored, mixed and matched on a single, digital
medium. Even 3-D representations of sculptural works
can be digitized. Creators can search, locate and reuse
pre-existing material to create new works, thus accelerating what French philosopher Blaise Pascal referred to
as the continuous human creation process. 209 From that
viewpoint, it can be said that digital technology is the
great common denominator of copyright. The technology also allows creators to disseminate their material
almost cost-free 210 around the world. 211 By the same
token, users can download material made available on
the Web, send it to friends, work colleagues or others
and (for the time being at least) without leaving a trace.
This technology is forcing the way in which copyright is used and administered to change. The traditional
exclusive rights (to prohibit use of protected material) are
difficult to apply in the Internet age. Even where a combination of technology and legal means may allow rightsholders to prevent such use, 212 users and consumers are
increasingly demanding digital access. The exclusive
right paradigm is gradually being replaced by a compensation/limited control paradigm. The focus is thus
shifting from preventing unauthorized uses to
organizing the types of acceptable uses and getting paid
for such uses. 213 Yet, the copyright ‘‘concept’’ is still the
best basis to claim financial compensation and organize
markets. It remains an absolutely essential tool for Canadian authors, creators, publishers and producers. Copyright does not have to be used by rightsholders (who
may waive their rights) but it allows those who want to
claim authorship (and no financial rewards) to do so. It
also allows those who expect a fair financial reward for
their creative efforts to obtain it.
A constant objective of copyright reform is the need
to strike a balance between creators’ rights and users’
needs. 214 For example, educational institutions need
material to perform their educational function and
libraries have needs concerning archiving, preservation
of damaged or special works, out-of-print works etc. 215 In
this context of rapid technological and business change,
the Canadian collective management system is at a critical juncture. Fuelled by the 1997 legislatives changes,
several new Collective Management Organizations have
been established and are in the process of setting up or
developing their licensing services. CMOs should
endeavour to weave the licensing of digital uses within
their current sphere of activity. Whether copyright and
neighbouring rights are appropriate for the digital age
depends in a large measure on the ability of users to
obtain in a user-friendly way the rights they need to use
material in digital form. To this end, and in the light of
the experience of other countries, it does not seem desirable to introduce new regulations concerning the formation or operations of Collective Management Organiza-
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tions, though CMOs should be encouraged to include in
their contracts a limited duration of rights transfers and
the appropriate degree of flexibility in letting
rightsholders leave or remove some of their works from
the system. This is already in place in many Collective
Management Organizations.
The most critical phase of the existence of a Collective Management Organization is the acquisition of
rights (to license). To accelerate and facilitate this process,
a review of foreign legislative techniques shows that an
extended licensing system would greatly facilitate the
work of certain Canadian collectives, especially those
operating under the section 70.1 regime. Contrary to
mandatory or even presumption-based systems,
extended licensing only works once a Collective Management Organization has garnered a sufficient degree of
credibility among the category of rightsholders it wishes
to represent. It then offers users the security of knowing
that the repertory of the Collective Management Organization is as complete as it can be. We suggest examining
the possibility of introducing such a system in Canada,
but only for Collective Management Organizations who
so wish (i.e., the system should be voluntary) and giving
rightsholders the option not to participate. Collective
Management Organizations who choose to use the
system could be the subject of specific transparency
and/or registration obligations, especially in light of their
duties towards non-member rightsholders.
The Copyright Board of Canada does not require a
major overhaul. Its processes and resources can always be
improved, however, and a system of alternative dispute
resolution could be useful, provided appropriate safeguards are in place. Individual agreements (that can take
precedence over tariffs) should be allowed in all cases,
except, perhaps, in cases where collective management is
mandatory. Introducing extended licensing would also
eliminate (in areas where it applies) the system of
rightsholders who cannot be located, thus eliminating a
significant administrative burden placed on the Board’s
shoulders. The Board could direct those energies
towards other tasks.
To be able to work efficiently in the digital environment and the complex rights matrix that licensing digital uses involves, Collective Management Organizations
need a powerful system (‘‘back-end’’) to keep track of the
rights, their collections and distributions, and a sophisticated interface (‘‘front-end’’) to offer member services
(e.g., online membership information, works registration)
and licensing options. Given the size of the Canadian
market and the budgets required to build such systems,
which can easily reach into the millions of dollars, it
seems unlikely that all Canadian Collective Management
Organizations can find the necessary funds. However,
the ‘‘need’’ identified a few years ago to build an allencompassing multimedia rights clearance centre has
not been demonstrated conclusively in any market,
except perhaps for encyclopaedia and anthology producers — hardly a justification for such an investment.
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While an information centre on copyright and its management is useful (at least as a Web presence) as part of a
generic copyright information service, a one-stop-shop
for the licensing of all works for all uses has not been
shown to be a priority.
To attain optimal efficiency on a reasonable scale,
Collective Management Organizations should thus be
encouraged to build sector-based systems. Each major
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sector, the needs of which will vary, should be able to
justify and support the necessary investment, especially if
it can be shown that their own interests (and the survival
of copyright) are at stake. In addition, CMOs should be
encouraged to work on common or at least interoperable digital identification systems, to allow the exchange
of appropriate data among themselves.
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Annex
List of Canadian Copyright Collective
Societies 216

A

collective society is an organization that administers the rights of several copyright owners. It can
grant permission to use their works and set the conditions for that use. Collective administration is widespread in Canada, particularly for music performance
rights, reprography rights and mechanical reproduction
rights. Some collective societies are affiliated with foreign
societies; this allows them to represent foreign copyright
owners as well.

Music
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ACTRA Performers’ Rights Society (PRS)
www.actra.com/prs
The ACTRA Performers’ Rights Society (PRS) is
responsible for the collection and distribution of fees,
royalties, residual fees and all other forms of compensation or remuneration to which members and permit
holders of the Alliance of Canadian Cinema Television
and Radio Artists (ACTRA), and others may be entitled
to as a result of their work or engagement in the
entertainment and related industries.
American Federation of Musicians (AFM)
www.afm.org
The American Federation of Musicians (AFM) advocates the rights of musicians in their live and recorded
performances in the United States and Canada and
other countries, and where it deems appropriate, collects
and distributes government mandated or other compulsory royalties of remuneration that are subject to collective administration.
ArtistI
www.uniondesartistes.com
ArtistI is the collective society of the Union des
artistes (UDA) for the remuneration of performers’ rights.
Audio-Video Licensing Agency (AVLA)
www.avla.ca
The Audio-Video Licensing Agency (AVLA) is a
copyright collective that administers the copyright for
the owners of master audio and music video recordings.
AVLA licenses the exhibition and reproduction of music
videos and the reproduction of audio recordings for
commercial use.
Canadian Musical Reproduction Rights Agency
(CMRRA)
www.cmrra.ca
The Canadian Musical Reproduction Rights Agency
(CMRRA) is a Canadian centralized licensing and collecting agency for the reproduction rights of musical
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works in Canada. It represents over 6,000 Canadian and
U.S. publishers who own and administer approximately
75% of the music recorded and performed in Canada.
Licensing is done on a per use basis.
Christian Copyright Licensing Inc. (CCLI)
www.ccli.com
The Christian Copyright Licensing Inc. (CCLI) was
created to help churches comply with the copyright law
and to compensate copyright owners fairly for such compliance. The CCLI issues licences to reproduce songs in
bulletins, liturgies and congregational song sheets; make
slides and transparencies of songs; print songs in customized songbooks; make customized arrangements of songs
and record worship services for tape ministry.
Neighbouring Rights Collective of Canada
(NRCC)
www.nrdv.ca
The Neighbouring Rights Collective of Canada
(NRCC) is a non-profit umbrella collective, created in
1997, to administer the rights of performers and makers
of sound recordings. This is done through five member
collectives: the American Federation of Musicians (AFM),
ArtistI, the Audio-Video Licensing Agency (AVLA), the
Société collective de gestion des droits des producteurs
de phonogrammes et vid éogrammes du Qu ébec
(SOPROQ) and the Alliance of Canadian Cinema Television and Radio Artists Performers Rights Society
(ACTRA PRS).
Société collective de gestion des droits des
producteurs de phonogrammes et vidéogrammes
du Québec (SOPROQ)
www.adisq.com
The Société collective de gestion des droits des
producteurs de phonogrammes et vidéogrammes du
Québec (SOPROQ) is a collective society which was
created to administer the rights due to producers of
audio and music video recordings. These rights include
remuneration for neighbouring rights and for private
copying of sound recordings.
Société de gestion des droits des artistes-musiciens
(SOGEDAM)
The Société de gestion des droits des artistesmusiciens (SOGEDAM) is a collective society created in
1997 to represent Canadian performers (musicians) and
performers who are members of foreign societies that
have mandated it to represent their interests.
Society for Reproduction Rights of Authors,
Composers and Publishers in Canada (SODRAC)
www.sodrac.com
The Society for Reproduction Rights of Authors,
Composers and Publishers in Canada (SODRAC)
administers royalties stemming from the reproduction of
musical works. It represents some 4,000 Canadian song-
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writers and music publishers as well as the musical repertoire of over 65 countries.
Society of Composers, Authors and Music
Publishers of Canada (SOCAN)
www.socan.ca
The Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN) is a performing rights society
that administers performing rights in musical works on
behalf of Canadian composers, authors and publishers as
well as affiliated societies representing foreign composers, authors and publishers.
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Literary (Literary works, dramatic works,
texts, etc.)
Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency
(CANCOPY)
www.cancopy.com
The Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency
(CANCOPY) represents writers, publishers and other
creators for the administration of copyright in all provinces except Quebec. The purpose of the collective is to
provide easy access to copyright material by negotiating
comprehensive licences with user groups, such as
schools, colleges, universities, governments, corporations,
etc., permitting reproduction rights, such as photocopy
rights, for the works in CANCOPY’s repertoire.
Canadian Screenwriters Collection Society (CSCS)
www.writersguildofcanada.com/cscs
The Canadian Screenwriters Collection Society
(CSCS) was created by the Writers Guild of Canada with
the mandate to claim, collect, administer and distribute
royalties and levies that film and television writers are
entitled to under the Canadian and other national copyright legislation of several European countries and other
jurisdictions.
Playwrights Union of Canada (PUC)
www.puc.ca
The Playwrights Union of Canada (PUC) is the
national service organization for professional playwrights. It represents nearly 335 members, distributes
more than 1,500 plays and offers many services to the
theatre-loving public. It acts as agent for the distribution
of rights and collection of royalties.
Société des auteurs et compositeurs dramatiques
(SACD)
www.sacd.fr
The Société des auteurs et compositeurs dramatiques (SACD) represents authors, composers and choreographers of dramatic works. It administers the copyright
in dramatic works (ballet, operas, etc.) and audiovisual
works (televised mini-series, motion pictures and television movies).

Société québécoise de gestion collective des droits
de reproduction (COPIBEC)
www.copibec.qc.ca
La Société québécoise de gestion collective des
droits de reproduction (COPIBEC) is the collective
society which authorizes, in Quebec, the reproduction of
works from Quebec, Canadian (through a bilateral agreement with CANCOPY) and foreign rightsholders.
COPIBEC was founded in 1997 by l’Union des
écrivaines et écrivains québécois (UNEQ) and the Association nationale des éditeurs de livres (ANEL).
Société québécoise des auteurs dramatiques
(SoQAD)
www.aqad.qc.ca
Founded in 1994, the Soci ét é qu éb écoise des
auteurs dramatiques (SoQAD) has the mandate of redistributing (redirect/forward) to Quebec, Canadian and
foreign playwrights whose works are performed in
public or private teaching institutions to the pre-school,
primary and secondary levels, royalties provided for in
the financial agreement between the Ministry of Education and the Association québécoise des auteurs dramatiques (AQAD).

Audio-Visual and Multimedia
Audio Ciné Films
www.acf-film.com
Audio Ciné Films Inc. (ACF) is Canada’s exclusive
non-theatrical distributor and public performance
licensing agent for Canadian, American and foreign feature film producers such as Universal Studios, Walt
Disney Pictures, Alliance-Atlantis, Paramount Pictures,
MGM Studios, Touchstone Pictures, PolyGram Filmed
Entertainment, United Artists, FineLine Features, Orion
Pictures, Hollywood Pictures, New Line Cinema, Behaviour, Miramax Films, Odeon, Sony Classics, Paramount
Classics, Blackwatch Releasing, Artisan Entertainment
and DreamWorks SKG among others. Films in 16MM,
35MM, videocassette and DVD.
Criterion Pictures
www.criterionpic.com
Criterion Pictures administers and manages both
educational (Visual Education Centre) and entertainment audiovisual works, including motion pictures distributed by Astral Films, Columbia Pictures, Tri-Star,
Warner Bros. and 20th Century Fox. It grants licences for
the use of these protected works.
Directors Rights Collective of Canada (DRCC)
email: Christiane@dgc.ca
The Directors Rights Collective of Canada (DRCC)
is a non-profit corporation founded by the Directors
Guild of Canada. Its mandate is to collect and distribute
royalties and levies to which film and television directors
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are entitled under the copyright legislation of jurisdictions throughout the world.
Producers Audiovisual Collective of Canada
email: info@pacc.ca
The Producers Audiovisual Collective of Canada
(PACC) is a non-profit corporation founded by the Canadian Film and Television Production Association
(CFTPA). Its purpose is to act on behalf of the producers
as a collective society for the management and distribution of royalties deriving from the sale of blank audiovisual media (‘‘blank tape levies’’) and from the rental and
lending of video recordings.
Société civile des auteurs multimédias (SCAM)
www.scam.fr
The Société civile des auteurs multimédias (SCAM)
represents the authors of literary works. It issues licences
and administers reproduction rights of literary works
intended for audio-visual media such as cinema, television and radio.
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Visual Arts (photographs, paintings, etc.)
Canadian Artists’ Representation Copyright
Collective (CARCC)
www.carfac.ca
CARCC (Canadian Artists’ Representation Copyright Collective) was established in 1990 to create opportunities for increased income for visual and media artists.
It provides its services to artists who affiliate with the
Collective. These services include negotiating the terms
for copyright use and issuing an appropriate licence to
the user.
Masterfile Corporation
www.masterfile.com
Masterfile Corporation is a visual content provider, a
stock image agency/library in the business of licensing
images for commercial use in media ranging from print
advertising to Internet Web sites. It acquires images
under exclusive contract from professional photographers and illustrators and organizes, archives, keywords,
promotes, licenses the images and distributes the royalties to the artists.
Société de droits d’auteur en arts visuels
(SODART)
www.raav.org/sodart
The Société de droits d’auteur en arts visuels
(SODART) was created by the Regroupement des
artistes en arts visuels du Québec (RAAV) and is responsible for collecting rights on behalf of visual artists. It
negotiates agreements with organizations that use visual
arts, such as museums, exhibition centres, magazines,
publishers, audio-visual producers, etc. SODART issues
licences to these organizations and collects royalties due
to the artists it represents.
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Society for Reproduction Rights of Authors,
Composers and Publishers in Canada (SODRAC)
www.sodrac.com
SODRAC’s Visual Arts and Crafts Department manages the rights of more than 17,000 Canadian and foreign creators of artistic works. SODRAC negotiates on
their behalf the conditions for the use of their works for
any of the purposes outlined in the Copyright Act, and
grants licences for public exhibition, communication to
the public by telecommunication and the reproduction
of their works on any media, including audiovisual and
multimedia. It collects and distributes royalties paid for
the right to use their works. To check if an artist is
represented by SODRAC’s Visual Arts and Crafts Department, please consult the ‘‘Repertoire’’ page under the
‘‘Artistic Works’’ section on its Web site.

Retransmission
Border Broadcasters’ Inc. (BBI)
Border Broadcasters’ Inc. (BBI) represents U.S.
border broadcasters (a mix of network affiliated and
independent stations in large and small markets along
the Canada–U.S. border). The royalties that BBI collects
and distributes to its members are for programs produced by the stations (i.e., the local programming) as
opposed to the network or syndicated programming
which is represented by other collectives.
Canadian Broadcasters Rights Agency (CBRA)
www.cbra.ca
The Canadian Broadcasters Rights Agency (CBRA)
claims royalties for programming, compilations and signals owned by commercial radio and television stations
and networks in Canada, including CTV, TVA and
Quatre-Saisons networks and their affiliates, the Global
Television Network, independent television stations and
the privately-owned affiliates of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) and Société Radio-Canada
(SRC).
Canadian Retransmission Collective (CRC)
www.crc-scrc.ca
The Canadian Retransmission Collective (CRC)
represents all PBS and TVOntario programming (producers) as well as owners of motion pictures and television drama and comedy programs produced outside the
United States (i.e., Canada and other countries).
Canadian Retransmission Right Association
(CRRA)
The Canadian Retransmission Right Association
(CRRA) is an association representing certain broadcasters, i.e.: the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
(CBC), the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), the
National Broadcasting Company (NBC), the Columbia
Broadcasting System (CBS) and T él é-Qu ébec with
respect to their interests as copyright owners of radio and
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television programming retransmitted as distant signals
in Canada. CRRA acts as the collective for its members,
collecting and distributing royalties paid by retransmitters in Canada.
Copyright Collective of Canada (CCC)
The Copyright Collective of Canada (CCC) represents copyright owners (producers and distributors) of
the U.S. independent motion picture and television production industry for all drama and comedy programming (such as companies represented by the Motion
Picture Association of America), except for that carried
on the PBS network stations.
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FWS Joint Sports Claimants (FWS)
The FWS Joints Sports Claimants (FWS) represents
the teams in major sports leagues whose games are regularly telecast in Canada and the United States. The
leagues are the National Hockey League, the National
Basketball Association and the Canadian, National and
American Football Leagues. The programs for which
copyright royalties are claimed are games broadcast
between the member teams on distant signals carried by
Canadian cable systems, except for those for which a
television network is the copyright owner.
Major League Baseball Collective of Canada (MLB)
The Major League Baseball Collective of Canada
(MLB) is the sole party entitled to claim royalties arising
out of the retransmission of major league baseball games
in Canada.
Society of Composers, Authors and Music
Publishers of Canada (SOCAN)
www.socan.ca
The Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN) is a performing rights society
that administers performing rights in musical works on
behalf of Canadian composers, authors and publishers as
well as affiliated societies representing foreign composers, authors and publishers. With respect to retransmission, SOCAN represents owners of the copyright in
the music that is integrated in the programming carried
in retransmitted radio and television signals. Rather than
claiming ownership of individual programs, SOCAN
asks for a share of the royalties for all works.

Private Copying
Canadian Private Copying Collective (CPCC)
www.cpcc.ca
The Canadian Private Copying Collective (CPCC) is
the collective society for the private copying levy. CPCC
is also responsible for distributing the funds generated
by the levy to the collective societies representing eligible
authors, performers and makers of sound recordings.
The member collectives of the CPCC are: the Canadian
Mechanical Reproduction Rights Agency (CMRRA), the
Neighbouring Rights Collective of Canada (NRCC), the
Société de gestion des droits des artistes-musiciens
(SOGEDAM), the Society for Reproduction Rights of
Authors, Composers and Publishers in Canada
(SODRAC) and the Society of Composers, Authors and
Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN).

Educational Rights
Educational Rights Collective of Canada (ERCC)
The Educational Rights Collective of Canada
(ERCC) is a non-profit collective established in 1998 to
represent the interests of copyright owners of television
and radio programs (news, commentary programs and
all other programs), when these programs are reproduced and performed in public by educational institutions for educational or training purposes.

Media Monitoring
Canadian Broadcasters Rights Agency (CBRA)
www.cbra.ca
The Canadian Broadcasters Rights Agency (CBRA)
claims royalties for programming and excerpts of programming owned by commercial radio and television
stations and networks in Canada, including CTV, TVA
and Quatre-Saisons networks and their affiliates, the
Global Television Network, independent television stations and the privately-owned affiliates of the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) and Société RadioCanada (SRC).
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Notes:
1

Article 27(2) reads: ‘‘Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral
and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.’’ Adopted and proclaimed by U.N.
General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948.

2

The other component is the ‘‘moral right’’.

3

In fact, the Statute of Anne of 1710, the first modern copyright law,
protected both authors and publishers/booksellers. Parliamentary debates
surrounding the adoption of the 1842 Act, which extended the term of
protection to a term based on the life of the author, showed that great
importance was attached to the role of the author and the societal importance of creativity. See M. Woodmansee. ‘‘The Cultural Work of Copyright: Legislating Authorship in Britain, 1837-1842’’, in Austin Sarat and
Thomas R. Kearns (eds.), Law in the Domains of Culture. (Michigan Univ.
Press, 2000), 65, 69; and Brad Sherman And Lionel Bently, The Making Of
Modern Intellectual Property Law, (Cambridge U. Press, 1999).

4

Now an international rule contained in Article 10 of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (known as ‘‘TRIPS’’)
of 1994, which is administered by the World Trade Organization.
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was presented at the 2001 Congress of the Association Littéraireet Artistique Internationale (ALAI) in New York. Available online: Columbia
Law School < http://www.law.columbia.edu/conferences/2001/
1_program_en.htm>.

30

WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, both signed on December 20, 1996. Not in force at the time of
this writing (although only three additional ratifications were required in
the case of the WCT and sic in the case of the WPPT). Both instruments
were signed but have not yet been ratified by Canada.

31

Assented to on April 25, 1997. It became S.C. 1997, c. 24.

32

Section 2: ‘‘A ‘collective society’ means a society, association or corporation that carries on the business of collective administration of copyright
or of the remuneration right conferred by section 19 or 81 for the benefit
of those who, by assignment, grant of licence, appointment of it as their
agent or otherwise, authorize it to act on their behalf in relation to that
collective administration, and (a) operates a licensing scheme, applicable in relation to a repertoire of works, performer’s performances,
sound recordings or communication signals of more than one author,
performer, sound recording maker or broadcaster, pursuant to which the
society, association or corporation sets out classes of uses that it
agrees to authorize under this Act, and the royalties and terms and
conditions on which it agrees to authorize those classes of uses, or (b)
carries on the business of collecting and distributing royalties or
levies payable pursuant to this Act.’’ (Emphasis added)

17

See also supra note 12 and accompanying text.

18

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, as amended until 1999 [hereinafter the Act].

19

CCH Canadian Ltd. v. L.S.U.C., [2000] 2 F.C. 451, at 454. See also Bishop
v. Stevens, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 467, at 478-479.

33

The author is grateful to Mr. Claude Majeau, Secretary of the Copyright
Board, for the permission to use the list in this paper.

Username: chauhana

11

22

20

Desputeaux v. Les Editions Chouette Inc. et al. , case No.
500-09-006389-985, April 18, 2001. Motion for leave to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court of Canada was granted. One could also
mention the Ontario case of Robertson v. Thomson Corp., [2001] O.J.
No. 3868 (Sup. Ct. of J.). See also Deborah Tussey, The Creative As
Enemy of the True: The Meaning of Originality in the Matthew Bender
Cases, 5 Rich. J. L. & T. 1030-5 (1999).

34

The number in parentheses is the number of societies operating in the
area in question mentioned on the Copyright Board’s list.

35

Supra note 19 at s. 19(1) and (2).

36

ArtistI is the collective society of the Union des artistes (UDA) for the
remuneration of performers’ rights. Available online: Union des Artistes
<http://www.uniondesartistes.com>.

✄ REMOVE

Date: 31-JUL-02

Time: 9:46

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\01_02_gervais.dat

Seq: 26

10

International Intellectual Property Alliance <http:// www.iipa.com>. Mr.
Siwek estimates that copyright industries added about 7.3% to the U.S.
Gross Domestic Product (US$678 billion) in 1999 and that their share of
the U.S. GD has grown by more than 300% between 1977 and 1999.

21

37

Subsection 68(2).

38

‘‘The Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (CANCOPY) represents
writers, publishers and other creators for the administration of copyright
in all provinces except Quebec. The purpose of the collective is to pro-

See for a recent detailed analysis of the importance of copyright in the
U.S. the study prepared by economist Stephen E. Siwek entitled Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy: The 2000 Report. It was published
by the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA). See online:

47

Collective Management of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights in Canada
vide easy access to copyright material by negotiating comprehensive
licences with user groups, such as schools, colleges, universities, governments, corporations, etc. permitting reproduction rights, such as photocopy rights, for the works in CANCOPY’s repertoire.’’ See online: the
Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency <www.cancopy.com>.
39
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